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Money Talks but It Isn’t Speech 
Deborah Hellman† 
  INTRODUCTION   
Buckley v. Valeo rests on the claim that restrictions on both 
giving and spending money are tantamount to restrictions on 
speech, and thus can only be sustained in the service of impor-
tant or compelling governmental interests.1 The justification 
for this claim offered by the Supreme Court in Buckley and in 
related cases that came after it is this: money facilitates 
speech; money incentivizes speech; and giving and spending 
money are themselves expressive activities. Therefore, restric-
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 1. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 44–45 (1976) (per curiam). While the 
Court in Buckley recognizes that expenditure and contribution limitations 
both implicate fundamental First Amendment interests, the Court treats the 
two as significantly different, subjecting expenditure restrictions to strict scru-
tiny review and contribution restrictions to intermediate scrutiny. See id. The 
Court reasons that expenditure limitations substantially restrain the quantity 
and diversity of political speech, while contribution limitations still allow polit-
ical expression of support and association. See id. at 23 (“[A]lthough the Act’s 
contribution and expenditure limitations both implicate fundamental First 
Amendment interests, its expenditure ceilings impose significantly more se-
vere restrictions on protected freedoms of political expression and association 
than do its limitations on financial contributions.”). 
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tions on giving and spending constitute restrictions on speech.2 
Missing from this analysis is the recognition that money facili-
tates and incentivizes the exercise of many other constitution-
ally protected rights. It does so because money is useful. More-
over, it is not at all obvious that restrictions on the ability to 
give or spend money to exercise these other rights are constitu-
tionally impermissible. One has the right to vote, but not to buy 
or sell votes. One has the right to private sexual intimacy, but 
not to spend money to facilitate the exercise of that right—
outlawing prostitution is constitutionally permissible. In order 
to determine if giving or spending money in connection with a 
right ought to be protected as a part of that right (within its 
penumbra, if you will), one needs a theory. Buckley provided 
only an inadequate one, resting its account on the claim that 
money facilitates speech.3 This Article urges the Court to 
broaden the lens through which it approaches this issue. Rath-
er than focus on the connection between money and speech, we 
ought instead to focus on the connection between money and 
rights more generally. The question we should ask is this: 
When do constitutionally protected rights include a right to 
give or spend money to effectuate them? The answer we give to 
this question will have implications for campaign finance law 
but will be grounded in a deeper understanding of the connec-
tion between money and rights.  
A reexamination of Buckley’s central premise is important 
in light of the Supreme Court’s recent holding in Citizens Unit-
ed v. FEC.4 In that case, the Court invalidated a federal law 
that prohibited corporations and unions from “using their gen-
eral treasury funds to make independent expenditures” for 
speech in connection with elections.5 There is much in this 
opinion to lament. Some critics will focus on the likely effects 
on the political process.6 Others will address the Court’s rejec-
                                                                                    
 2. Cf. id. at 14–23 (annunciating the Court’s general approach to ex-
penditure and contribution limits). 
 3. E.g., id. at 52 n.58 (“[A] candidate’s expenditure of . . . funds directly 
facilitates . . . political speech.”). 
 4. 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010). 
 5. Id. at 886. 
 6. See, e.g., James Sample, Court Reform Enters the Post-Caperton Era, 
58 DRAKE L. REV. 787, 792–93, 800 (2010) (lamenting the effect of Citizens 
United on judicial elections); Molly J. Walker Wilson, Too Much of a Good 
Thing: Campaign Speech After Citizens United, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 2365, 
2368–69 (2010) (challenging Citizens United based on the potential for corrup-
tion); Saul Zipkin, The Election Period and Regulation of the Democratic 
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tion of the view that the reasons to respect the freedom of 
speech of real persons are not consonant with the reasons to 
protect the speech of corporations and unions.7 Also disturbing, 
however, is the way the Court handles the central Buckley 
claim—the Court considered it so obvious that restrictions on 
spending money amount to restrictions on speech that it 
needed no discussion at all, not even a citation to Buckley.8  
Money is clearly important to speaking. Without money, 
how would one publish a newspaper, buy a television adver-
tisement, or pay campaign workers?9 Sometimes giving money 
is also itself expressive of one’s support for a political candi-
date.10 Indeed, giving a lot of money may be a way of express-
ing very strong support for a candidate or a position.11 So, 
spending money facilitates speaking and giving money can be 
expressive itself. This Article explores whether either of these 
ways that money is connected to speaking support the claim 
that limitations on the giving and spending of money ought to 
be treated as restrictions on speech under the First Amend-
ment.  
In order to develop an account of when spending money to 
speak ought to be protected as a part of the right to free speech, 
it is helpful to look at when and why other constitutionally pro-
tected rights include the right to spend money to effectuate 
them. In so doing, this Article develops an account of when 
spending money in connection with rights should be conceived 
as within the penumbra of the right and when it should not. 
Using this account, I conclude that spending money in connec-
tion with elections need not always be considered a part of the 
freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
Process, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 533, 587–93 (2010) (discussing Citizens 
United in terms of the debate over democratic process). 
 7. See, e.g., Dale Rubin, Corporate Personhood: How the Courts Have 
Employed Bogus Jurisprudence to Grant Corporations Constitutional Rights 
Intended for Individuals, 28 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 523, 550 (2010); Lyle Dennis-
ton, Analysis: The Personhood of Corporations, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 21, 2010, 
6:45 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/?p=15376. 
 8. Citizens United does cite Buckley at other points in the case, however. 
Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. passim. 
 9. Cf. Eugene Volokh, Why Buckley v. Valeo Is Basically Right, 34 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 1095, 1101 (2002) (discussing the need for money in exercising consti-
tutional rights).  
 10. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976) (per curiam) (“A contribution 
serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views . . . .”). 
 11. Id. 
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This Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes the de-
fense of Buckley’s central claim found in the scholarly litera-
ture. It then divides the relationship between money and 
speech into three components: money provides incentives to 
speak, money facilitates speech, and giving and spending mon-
ey can itself be expressive. Only this last component raises a 
uniquely First Amendment-related concern.  
Part II argues that none of these connections between 
money and speech provide sufficient reason to treat restrictions 
on giving and spending money as restrictions on speech. It be-
gins by arguing that the expressive dimension of giving and 
spending money does not provide sufficient reason to treat 
these activities as speech under the First Amendment. It then 
turns to the facilitative and incentivizing functions of money. 
While giving and spending facilitates and incentivizes the exer-
cise of many other constitutionally protected rights, giving and 
spending are often not treated as protected within the penum-
bras of these rights. Thus, the fact that money facilitates or in-
centivizes the exercise of a right is not sufficient to show that 
giving and spending money in connection with rights should be 
protected. This conclusion leads to the following question: 
When do constitutionally protected rights generate a penum-
bral right to give or spend money? 
Part III turns from critique to reconstruction. It proposes a 
way of understanding why some rights include a right to give 
and spend money while others do not. Briefly, where the good 
used to effectuate the right is distributed via the market, then 
a right which depends on that good includes the right to spend 
money. For example, abortion services are distributed via the 
market. Thus the right to abort a previable fetus includes the 
right to spend money to obtain an abortion. Where the good 
used to effectuate the right is not distributed via the market, 
then a right which depends on that good does not include the 
right to spend money. For example, votes are not distributed 
via the market. Thus, the right to vote does not include the 
right to buy or sell votes or even to pay someone to vote. This 
analysis suggests that restrictions on campaign giving and 
spending may not be restrictions on speech. When Congress 
takes electioneering out of the market, especially if it does so by 
providing public funding of campaigns, then restrictions on giv-
ing and spending in elections do not restrict speech and thus do 
not require heightened judicial review.  
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I.  BUCKLEY ’S CENTRAL CLAIM AND SUPPORTING 
RATIONALE   
The framework by which courts assess campaign finance 
laws is set up by Buckley. Buckley’s central claim is that re-
strictions on giving and spending money should be treated as 
restrictions on “speech” as that term is used in the First 
Amendment.12 For ease of exposition, let’s call this claim “C.” 
This Article argues against C.  
The most common form of argument for C offered in the lit-
erature has the following form. If we reject C, we must reject a 
line of cases that we are likely unprepared to reject—or, if we 
reject C, we will commit ourselves to some untenable conclu-
sions. For example, Kathleen Sullivan makes an argument of 
the first kind,13 which is described in detail below. Eugene Vol-
okh makes an argument of the second kind.14 If the conse-
quences of rejecting C are indeed untenable, clearly C must be 
right, or so the argument goes. This section examines these ar-
guments against C. In what follows, this Article focuses on the 
arguments Kathleen Sullivan presents, because a careful ex-
amination of the reasoning in the cases she cites exposes the 
flaws in the argument for treating restrictions on giving and 
spending money as restrictions on speech. Recognizing these 
flaws suggests new lines of inquiry. Eugene Volokh’s argument 
is taken up in Part III, as it rests on the claim that constitu-
tional rights more generally include a right to spend money to 
effectuate them,15 a claim this Article rejects. Thus, an exami-
nation of his examples provides an appropriate way to test the 
theory I propose.  
Sullivan argues that “[a]ny blanket reversal of Buckley’s 
premise that restrictions on political money implicate the First 
Amendment thus would bring down a great deal of law in its 
wake.”16 If we are unwilling to countenance the reversal of this 
case law, we must accept that restrictions on political money 
are restrictions on speech and thus are subject to exacting First 
Amendment review. The cases she cites are United States v. 
National Treasury Employees Union, in which the Supreme 
                                                                                    
 12. See id. at 14 (“The Act’s contribution and expenditure limitations op-
erate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities.”). 
 13. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH 
L. REV. 311. 
 14. Volokh, supra note 9. 
 15. Id. at 1096–97. 
 16. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 317. 
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Court invalidated a federal law that prohibited federal em-
ployees from receiving compensation for activities including 
giving speeches and writing articles;17 Village of Schaumburg 
v. Citizens for a Better Environment, in which the Supreme 
Court invalidated a village ordinance which required that non-
profit organizations wishing to solicit door-to-door limit admin-
istrative and overhead expenses to no more than twenty-five 
percent of proceeds;18 Meyer v. Grant, which struck down a Col-
orado law criminalizing the use of paid petition circulators;19 
Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, where the Court limited a 
state law that allowed a government employer and a union to 
agree to an “agency shop” arrangement whereby all employees 
must either join the union or pay a fee equal to union dues;20 
and Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State 
Crime Victims Board,21 in which the court invalidated a New 
York law that required that all proceeds earned by accused, 
convicted, or admitted criminals from descriptions of their 
crimes be escrowed in order to be available to victims of these 
crimes.22 
While all of these cases address whether limitations on 
money used in connection with speaking raise First Amend-
ment issues, they do so in different ways. In both National 
Treasury Employees Union and Simon & Schuster, restrictions 
on payment affect incentives to speak.23 In Meyer, restrictions 
on spending limit the ways that money facilitates speech.24 
Abood focuses on the way that giving and spending money itself 
can be expressive.25 Finally, Village of Schaumburg addresses 
whether soliciting money can occur in a context that is inti-
mately tied or intertwined with persuasion.26  
                                                                                    
 17. United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 457 (1995). 
 18. Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 622 
(1980). 
 19. Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 415–16 (1988). 
 20. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 211, 240–41 (1977). 
 21. 502 U.S. 105, 123 (1991).  
 22. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 316–17. 
 23. See United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454, 469 
(1995); Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 116–17. 
 24. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 424. 
 25. See Abood, 431 U.S. at 234. 
 26. See Vill. of Schaumberg v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 444 U.S. 620, 
632–33 (1980). 
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A. MONEY AS INCENTIVE TO SPEAK 
In National Treasury Employees Union, the Court ad-
dressed the way that restrictions on payment affect incentives 
to speak.27 The law at issue in the case forbade federal em-
ployees from being paid to give speeches or write articles.28 Is 
this a restriction on “speech” that would thus require a de-
manding First Amendment analysis or a restriction on conduct 
with incidental effects on speech, which is subject to a much 
lower standard of review?29 The first point to note is that Jus-
tice Stevens’s opinion for the Court provides very little sus-
tained discussion of this question. Instead, he quickly concludes 
that “[a]lthough § 501(b) neither prohibits any speech nor dis-
criminates among speakers based on the content or viewpoint 
of their message, its prohibition on compensation unquestiona-
bly imposes a significant burden on expressive activity.”30 And 
how do we know that this burden abridges the freedom of 
speech, i.e., implicates the First Amendment? After all, the 
Court admits, the law does not directly restrict speech,31 and 
thus we need an argument to show that this law does in fact 
raise First Amendment issues. Here is what Justice Stevens 
had to say: “Publishers compensate authors because compensa-
tion provides a significant incentive toward more expression. 
By denying respondents that incentive, the honoraria ban in-
duces them to curtail their expression if they wish to continue 
working for the Government.”32 Is this a good argument? 
The argument goes like this: 
1. The law does not prohibit speech, nor does it distinguish on the 
basis of viewpoint or content.33 
2. The law burdens speech.34 
3. Compensation provides an incentive for people to express them-
selves.35 
                                                                                    
 27. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 469–70, 481–82. 
 28. Id. at 457. 
 29. See United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (“[W]hen 
‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a 
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech ele-
ment can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms.”). 
 30. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. at 468. 
 31. See id. 
 32. Id. at 469. 
 33. Id. at 468. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 469. 
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4. Forbidding that incentive induces people to stop speaking or not 
to speak.36 
Thus, 
5. The law “imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under 
the First Amendment.”37 
This is the order in which the Court presents the argu-
ment, but claim 2 is best understood as the conclusion of claims 
3 and 4. The argument is best reconstructed as follows: 
1. The law does not prohibit speech nor does it distinguish on the 
basis of viewpoint or message. 
2. Compensation provides an incentive for people to express them-
selves. 
3. Forbidding that incentive induces people to stop speaking or not 
to speak. 
Thus, 
4. The law burdens speech. 
Thus, 
5. The law “imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech under 
the First Amendment.”38 
Stated nakedly like this, one can easily see the flaws in the 
argument. Both the preliminary conclusion (at 4) and the final 
conclusion (at 5) do not clearly follow from the premises that 
precede them. The fact that a law has an effect on the amount 
of speaking or the incentives to produce speech does not neces-
sarily lead to the conclusion that a law burdens speech. Second, 
even if a law burdens speech, a court must assess the degree to 
which it does so before concluding that this burden puts the law 
into the category of laws that abridge the freedom of speech—
and are therefore only justified if the state produces a compel-
ling justification. 
To see the flaw at 4 clearly, consider the following analogy. 
Federal law prohibits voters from receiving compensation for 
either the act of voting or for casting a vote in a particular 
way.39 Does this law burden the right to vote and thus risk vi-
olating the Constitution? Consider the following argument.  
                                                                                    
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 470. The Court also mentions that the law burdens the public’s 
right to read and hear what would otherwise be produced, but acknowledges 
that there is no way to assess the size of that loss. Id. at 455. While the Court 
notes that a real treasure might thereby be lost, like a Melville or Hawthorne 
(a point Sullivan emphasizes), the Court acknowledges that the actual law in 
question would not have applied to their work as the law explicitly allows 
compensation for works of fiction. Id. at 470 n.16. 
 38. Id. 
 39. 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2006) (“Whoever makes or offers to make an expendi-
ture to any person, either to vote or withhold his vote, or to vote for or against 
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1. This law does not prohibit voting nor does it distinguish on the 
basis of which way a voter will cast her ballot. 
2. Compensation provides an incentive for people to vote. 
3. Forbidding that incentive induces people to stop voting or not to 
vote at all (witness the large percentage of eligible voters who fail to 
vote or even to register). 
Thus,  
4. This law burdens the right to vote. 
This argument is clearly wrong. Laws that forbid voters 
from accepting compensation for voting clearly do not even 
raise colorable claims to burden the right to vote.40 Why not? 
Payment can induce all sorts of actions, not just or especially 
speech and expression.41 The voting case shows that blocking 
this inducement is not enough to establish that the right in 
question has been burdened. More is needed. What this com-
parison to voting shows is that merely noting the effect on in-
centives is not enough to claim that spending or receiving mon-
ey in connection with a right ought to be seen as integral to the 
right itself. 
Next consider the move from 4 to 5. Suppose, for the sake 
of argument, that the law at issue in National Treasury Em-
ployees Union does indeed burden the right to speak. Should 
one conclude that any burden, no matter its size or nature, 
raises First Amendment concerns? The current estate tax also 
likely has an effect on the amount of expression produced, and 
yet the claim that the estate tax implicates the First Amend-
ment seems farfetched. The argument is, however, analogous. 
1. The law [estate tax] does not prohibit speech nor does it distin-
guish on the basis of viewpoint or message. 
2. Having enough money to live without working frees people to 
produce creative work. 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
any candidate; and [w]hoever solicits, accepts, or receives any such expendi-
ture in consideration of his vote or the withholding of his vote [s]hall be fined 
. . . or imprisoned . . . .”); id. § 600 (“Whoever . . . promises any employment, 
position, compensation, contract, appointment, or other benefit . . . to any per-
son as consideration, favor, or reward for any political activity or for the sup-
port of or opposition to any candidate or any political party in connection with 
any general or special election to any political office . . . shall be fined under 
this title or imprisoned not more than one year, or both.”). 
 40. Laws that require voters to pay a fee to vote, on the other hand, clear-
ly do. See Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966) (“[A] 
State violates the Equal Protection Clause . . . [if ] it makes the affluence of the 
voter or payment of any fee an electoral standard.”). 
 41. See, e.g., Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 414 (1988) (providing an exam-
ple of a situation where money was used to induce people to circulate petitions). 
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3. Taking a large proportion of that money away induces people to 
work at paid jobs rather than devoting their time to creative expres-
sion. 
Thus, 
4. The law burdens speech. 
Thus, 
5. The estate tax imposes the kind of burden that abridges speech 
under the First Amendment. 
Something is missing between 4 and 5. The fact that a law 
burdens speech, if it does, is not enough to conclude that this 
burden brings the law into the category of restrictions that 
raise First Amendment concerns.42 As the estate tax example 
shows, a myriad of laws affect speech and yet clearly do not 
raise First Amendment issues.43 
B. MONEY AS FACILITATOR OF SPEECH 
Meyer addresses how restrictions on money can affect 
speech because spending money facilitates speaking.44 In this 
case, the Supreme Court struck down a Colorado statute that 
criminalized paying money to people to circulate petitions in 
the context of ballot initiatives.45 Although the law forbade pay-
ing money to petition circulators and not the circulating of peti-
tions itself, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court, concluded 
that “this case involves a limitation on political expression sub-
ject to exacting scrutiny.”46 He offered two reasons for this con-
clusion: “[f]irst, it limits the number of voices who will convey 
appellees’ message and the hours they can speak and, there-
fore, limits the size of the audience they can reach”; and 
“[s]econd, it makes it less likely that appellees will garner the 
number of signatures necessary to place the matter on the bal-
                                                                                    
 42. See id. at 418–19 (implying that some burdens on speech can be over-
come by countervailing interests in a way that make such burdens permissible 
under the First Amendment). 
 43. Another possible explanation for the outcome of the case is that the 
law at issue violates the First Amendment because it targets speech. See infra 
Part I.E. 
 44. See Meyer, 486 U.S. at 422–23 (suggesting that a “refusal to permit [pro-
ponents of a new law] to pay petition circulators restricts political expression”). 
 45. State statutory and constitutional law can be changed through ballot 
initiatives in Colorado. In order to place a measure on the ballot, its propo-
nents must garner a specified number of signatures. The law governing the 
initiative process provides, in part, that it is a felony to pay petition circula-
tors. Id. at 415–16.  
 46. Id. at 420 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 45 (1976)).  
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lot, thus limiting their ability to make the matter the focus of 
statewide discussion.”47 What do these arguments prove? 
If one is not able to pay petition circulators, one will be left 
only with volunteers. As the Court notes, this law will thus 
likely “limit[] the number of voices who will convey appellees’ 
message.”48 While the Court is surely correct that fewer people 
will do this work for free than would do so if paid,49 this fact 
does not show that the right of free speech is itself implicated.  
Laws that set minimum wages or forbid child labor are also 
likely to affect the ability of the Meyer appellee to get his mes-
sage out. If he could pay less than the minimum wage or em-
ploy child labor, his money would go farther, thereby allowing 
him to have more people to circulate the petitions. Yet, we are 
unlikely to conclude, based on this fact alone, that these laws 
raise First Amendment issues. While there might be important 
or even compelling governmental interests at stake in the case 
of minimum wage or child labor laws, demonstration of such is 
not necessary. It seems almost crazy to suggest that such laws 
limit speech and thus must pass exacting judicial review. Rath-
er, these laws simply do not limit speech at all, despite the fact 
that they are likely to have a predictable effect on the number 
of people willing to convey a person’s message. These are only 
representative examples. It is incredibly easy to come up with 
examples of laws which would have negative consequences for 
expression. The fact that a law makes it more difficult to exer-
cise First Amendment rights does not on its own demonstrate 
that the law restricts speech.  
C. GIVING AND SPENDING MONEY AS EXPRESSIVE CONDUCT 
Giving and spending money can sometimes be expressive. 
Abood recognized this fact and limited the ways in which the 
state may constitutionally require that a person give or spend 
his money.50 At issue in Abood was a Michigan law that al-
lowed a union and a government employer to agree to an “agen-
cy shop” arrangement.51 In such a set up, every employee must 
either join the union or pay a fee to the union equal to the un-
ion dues.52 The Court ruled that while the nonunion employee 
                                                                                    
 47. Id. at 422–23.  
 48. Id. at 422. 
 49. Id. at 422–23. 
 50. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235–36 (1977). 
 51. Id. at 213–14. 
 52. Id. at 212. 
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may be forced to support union activities with which he disa-
grees, his money cannot be used for expressive activities 
(speaking, political contributions) that he does not endorse.53 
Forced subsidization of action and of speech are different, in 
the Court’s view.54 In other words, a person may be forced to 
express (via giving money) the message implicit in her actions, 
but she may not be forced to express (via giving money) the 
message that money makes possible.  
While the Court is undoubtedly right that giving and 
spending money can be expressive, the Court must be careful 
not to take this point too far else taxpayers object to the uses 
their tax money is put to on First Amendment grounds.55 More-
over, the fact that giving and spending money can be expressive 
does not mean that it is always expressive or that all giving 
and spending activities are equally expressive. One could de-
scribe all actions as expressive of the attitudes or values of the 
person acting. When I buy an expensive cashmere sweater, I 
express my attitude about clothes, dressing well, and luxury 
goods. When I give money to a homeless shelter, I express that 
I care about the fate of the homeless and perhaps about the ob-
ligations we each have to one another. But surely this proves 
too much. If giving and spending money are always expressive, 
then all economic regulations risk impinging on the First 
Amendment.56 
                                                                                    
 53. Id. at 235–36 (ruling that while the union may engage in speech and 
political activity, “such expenditures [must] be financed from charges, dues, or 
assessments paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas and 
who are not coerced into doing so against their will by the threat of loss of gov-
ernment employment”).  
 54. See id.  
 55. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105–06 (1968) (holding that the 
Establishment Clause specifically limits the taxing and spending powers of 
Congress and that taxpayers have standing to assert such constitutional viola-
tions). The Court’s holding in Flast has been limited to specific spending ap-
propriations. See Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found. Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 
593 (2007) (rejecting taxpayer standing for Establishment Clause violations 
when Congress fails to “specifically authorize the use of federal funds” for the 
religious purpose); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation 
of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 479–80 (1982) (rejecting taxpayer 
standing for Establishment Clause violations when (1) the challenge is not to a 
congressional action but to an agency action, and (2) the action is not taken 
under the Taxing and Spending Clause). Still, if spending decisions are ex-
pressive, then taxpayers may have arguments based on notions of compelled 
speech to object to these decisions.  
 56. The least relevant case of those cited by Sullivan is Village of 
Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980). In that 
case, the Court considered the constitutionality of a village ordinance forbid-
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D. ARGUMENT SUMMARY 
Sullivan argues that one risks wreaking havoc with First 
Amendment doctrine if one rejects Buckley’s central claim that 
restrictions on giving and spending money in political cam-
paigns are restrictions on speech (previously identified as C).57 
In the cases she cites as at risk, were we to reject C, money in-
centivizes speech, facilitates speech, or is itself expressive. 
When money incentivizes or facilitates speech (which are clear-
ly related), this discussion of the cases show that it is not 
enough to note that forbidding or limiting money will lead to 
less speech. It is not surprising that money incentivizes and 
facilitates speech because money is a general purpose and fun-
gible good and is thus useful to the attainment of many ends. 
Payment of money would likely provide an incentive for people 
to vote, yet forbidding payment for voting does not violate the 
right to vote. Paying lower than the minimum wage would like-
ly facilitate the ability to circulate petitions to more people, yet 
a law forbidding paying less than the minimum wage clearly 
does not violate the right to free speech. If the holdings of these 
cases are to be defended, there must be some reason that the 
facilitative and incentivizing functions of money are especially 
important in the free speech context or that the limit imposed 
on money spending here works a particular kind of burden on 
the exercise of that right.  
Giving and spending money can also be expressive. When 
it is, restrictions on giving and spending money raise First 
Amendment issues. But not all giving and spending of money 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
ding door-to-door solicitation by charitable organizations that do not devote a 
specified percentage of revenues to charitable purposes. Id. at 622. The Court 
struck down the ordinance on the ground that “solicitation is characteristically 
intertwined with informative and perhaps persuasive speech seeking support 
for particular causes or for particular views on economic, political, or social 
issues.” Id. at 632. In other words, it is not the fact that the government is 
restricting the collection of money that is the problem. Rather, it is the fact 
that nonprofit organizations typically combine solicitation with protected 
speech activities when they canvass door-to-door.  
While Village of Schaumburg does address the compatibility of restric-
tions on money with the First Amendment, Sullivan is mistaken to suggest 
that the holding in the case is relevant to whether restrictions on giving and 
spending money in the context of political campaigns raise First Amendment 
concerns. Where giving, spending, or soliciting cannot realistically be sepa-
rated from clear speech activity, then the state may not prohibit the former. 
Limitations on how much a person may give to a political candidate or how 
much a person or candidate may spend in the context of a campaign have no 
such problem of intertwining speech and money-raising activities. 
 57. Sullivan, supra note 13, at 324–26. 
  
966 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:953 
 
should be seen as expressive enough to raise the specter of the 
First Amendment. Rather, one must assess whether the money 
spending is especially expressive such that it warrants review 
under the First Amendment. 
E. TARGETING SPEECH 
The fact that the Court’s explanations for the cases Sulli-
van catalogues do not provide an adequate justification for the 
outcomes does not mean that there is no alternative account 
that would. While the cases themselves highlight the ways in 
which money facilitates speech, incentivizes speech, or alterna-
tively is itself expressive, perhaps one can defend the results in 
some of these cases on the grounds that the laws in question 
target or aim to suppress speech.58 For example, one could say 
that the law at issue in Simon & Schuster aimed to suppress 
distasteful books. Similarly, one could argue that the law at 
issue in Meyer aimed at making it more difficult to circulate 
petitions. Perhaps, but one might also describe these laws in 
another way. One could say that the law in Simon & Schuster 
aimed to ensure that a person does not profit from his own 
wrong.59 After all, if there were a similar market for trinkets 
memorializing the crimes as there is for memoirs describing 
them, the New York law might have been written to apply to 
profits from these trinkets as well. Similarly, one could describe 
the law forbidding payment for petition circulators as aimed at 
ensuring that petitions on the ballot have serious genuine sup-
port as evidenced both by signatures and by the dedication of 
willing volunteers to circulate them.  
It is not clear that these laws target speech.60 Laws that 
target the suppression of speech surely are suspect on First 
                                                                                    
 58. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (holding that “a 
government regulation is sufficiently justified if . . . the governmental interest 
is unrelated to the suppression of free expression . . . .”); see also Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (“A 
statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First Amendment if it imposes 
a financial burden on speakers because of the content of their speech.” (citing 
Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 447 (1991))). 
 59. See Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S. at 119 (noting that New York “has an 
undisputed compelling interest in ensuring that criminals do not profit from 
their crimes”). 
 60. O’Brien treats this question as an objective inquiry that is not depend-
ent on the subjective motivations of the legislators at issue. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 
at 383–84 (“Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous 
matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court 
will look to statements by legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the leg-
islature, because the benefit to sound decisionmaking in this circumstance is 
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Amendment grounds. If any of the laws in these cases do aim to 
suppress speech, the laws then raise a First Amendment issue 
and thus can only be justified by a compelling governmental 
interest. Part III will return to this alternative explanation and 
suggest a way to help determine which of these laws, if any, 
aim at suppressing speech.  
II.  THE FUNCTIONS OF MONEY   
The prior section highlighted three ways in which money is 
connected to speaking. First, money can provide incentives to 
speak.61 Second, money facilitates speaking.62 Third, giving and 
spending money can themselves be expressive.63 It is important 
to note that only this last function of money is uniquely con-
nected to the First Amendment. Money can also provide incen-
tives for the exercise of other constitutionally protected rights, 
and money can facilitate the exercise of these rights. This Part 
begins with a discussion of the expressive function of money. 
This connection between money and speech provides the weak-
est reason for treating restrictions on giving and spending as 
First Amendment concerns, and so it makes sense to dispose of 
it first. While giving and spending money can be expressive, 
giving and spending alone are not expressive enough to bring 
that activity within the First Amendment. This Part then turns 
to the facilitative and incentivizing functions of money. While 
money does facilitate and incentivize the exercise of the First 
Amendment right to speak, money facilitates and incentivizes 
the exercise of other constitutionally protected rights as well. 
Yet, giving and spending are not or ought not to be protected as 
a part of these rights. This section surveys several such rights 
and concludes that the fact that money facilitates or incentiviz-
es the exercise of a right is not sufficient to show that a right 
includes a penumbral right to spend money to effectuate it.  
                                                                                                                                                                                   
thought sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress’s purpose. It is 
entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is, under 
well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than 
a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates one legislator to 
make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of oth-
ers to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew guesswork. 
We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which 
Congress had the undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its 
exact form if the same or another legislator made a ‘wiser’ speech about it.”). 
 61. See supra Part I.A. 
 62. See supra Part I.B. 
 63. See supra Part I.C. 
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A. THE EXPRESSIVE FUNCTION OF MONEY AND ITS FIRST 
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
The fact that giving and spending money can be expressive 
highlights a special connection to the First Amendment. Giving 
money is one way of expressing one’s view, but the relevant 
question is whether giving or spending money is expressive 
enough to call the First Amendment into play. And if so, in 
what way? All actions—including speaking and writing—have 
meaning, but not all actions constitute “speech” protected by 
the First Amendment. The threshold question in any case is, as 
the Court recognized in Texas v. Johnson, “whether particular 
conduct possesses sufficient communicative elements to bring 
the First Amendment into play.”64 Answering that question re-
quires the Court to ask whether “a[n] intent to convey a partic-
ularized message was present, and [whether] the likelihood 
was great that the message would be understood by those who 
viewed it.”65 Employing this test, it is not at all clear that 
Abood was rightly decided.66 The nonunion employees required 
to contribute to the union in the amount of the regular union 
dues clearly did not intend to convey a message by contribut-
ing.67 And, more importantly, the agency shop arrangement 
would neutralize any message that the objective observer 
would be likely to take from such contribution. As everyone 
knew that contributions were mandatory, no one would think 
the nonunion employees in fact endorsed the message conveyed 
by the union.  
The fact that Abood68 may have been wrongly decided does 
not tell us whether the giving and spending of money in politi-
cal campaigns is expressive activity protected by the First 
Amendment. To start, the conduct that the Court has treated 
as “possess[ing] sufficient communicative elements to bring the 
First Amendment into play” has been limited to highly symbol-
ic conduct.69 Johnson is an easy case with regard to the ques-
                                                                                    
 64. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989). 
 65. Id. (quoting Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974)). 
 66. Compare id. (identifying the relevant inquiry as a determination of 
intent to convey a particular message), with Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 
U.S. 209, 209 (1977) (demonstrating a lack of intent to convey a particular 
group message). 
 67. Abood, 431 U.S. at 209–11. 
 68. For further discussion of this case, which Sullivan threatens we might 
have to reject if we reject C, see supra Part I.C.  
 69. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404; see also infra notes 70–73 and accompanying 
text. 
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tion of whether the conduct is expressive, because “the flag as 
readily signifies this Nation as does the combination of letters 
found in ‘America.’”70 Wearing black armbands,71 conducting a 
sit-in by blacks in a “whites only” area,72 and wearing military 
uniforms in the context of a presentation73 each carry a specific 
meaning or message, while giving of money does not.  
To test one’s intuition on this point, consider whether giv-
ing money in other contexts raises First Amendment concerns. 
First, consider an estate tax law which limits the amount of 
money that may be given as a gift in any given year to $13,000 
per recipient before such amount is counted as part of the do-
nor’s estate (and thus subject to estate tax limits). Suppose a 
wealthy parent were to challenge this law on the grounds that 
it intrudes on her ability to express the depth of her love for her 
child (via a gift larger than $13,000), and thus abridges her 
freedom of speech. Second, consider a law which prohibits giv-
ing money to organizations listed on the State or Treasury De-
partment’s list of terrorist organizations. Suppose a person 
were to challenge this law on the grounds that forbidding gifts 
to these organizations infringes his right to express his support 
for these groups’ activities?74  
While giving money to a child or a terrorist organization 
does express love or support for the recipient of the gift, the act 
of giving money ought not to be viewed as possessing “sufficient 
communicative elements to bring the First Amendment into 
play.”75 First, in these cases, unlike in the case of flag burning, 
draft-card burning, and arm-band wearing, one cannot say that 
the “medium is the message.”76 This is because the action (giv-
ing money) does not carry a specific meaning. Second, and this 
is a related point, there are many alternative ways of making 
as strong a statement of love for a child or support for a terror-
                                                                                    
 70. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 405 (noting that the flag is “[p]regnant with ex-
pressive content”).  
 71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969). 
 72. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966). 
 73. Schact v. United States, 398 U.S. 58, 62–63 (1970). 
 74. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act of 1996 violates the First Amendment by criminalizing the giving 
of material support to organizations deemed terrorist organizations by the 
State Department).  
 75. Johnson, 491 U.S. at 404. 
 76. MARSHALL MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF 
MAN 7 (1964) (emphasizing the significance of a medium to the content of 
what is expressed).  
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ist organization that do not involve giving money. These ways 
of expressing love or support may not be as useful to the recip-
ient, but utility is a different question. By contrast, the special 
symbolic significance of flag burning, for example, meant that 
alternative ways to express disapproval of the government 
would be less potent as expression. Third, treating the giving of 
money as expressive action would bring lots of conduct within 
the First Amendment’s purview, so much so that one ought to 
pause before concluding that giving money is expressive 
enough to constitute protected speech. In sum, it is not at all 
clear that giving or spending money is expressive enough to 
bring the First Amendment into play at all. 
Even if it were, perhaps giving and spending money should 
be considered to be conduct that is intertwined with speech—a 
category that the Court subjects to a lower standard of re-
view.77 Here, the relevant case is United States v. O’Brien.78 
Rather than look at the conduct as speech, one looks at the two 
aspects separately. There is the expressive conduct that is 
treated as speech and there is the conduct itself. In the case of 
draft-card burning, there is an expressive element (conveying 
an antiwar message) and the simple destruction of the card. 
O’Brien subjects restrictions on such combined cases to a much 
lower standard of review than is required for restrictions on 
“pure speech.”79 The D.C. Circuit opinion, overruled by Buckley, 
applied the analysis from O’Brien, and finding it satisfied 
upheld restrictions on both giving and spending.80 The previous 
analysis should leave one unconvinced that giving and spend-
ing money in elections is expressive enough to warrant any 
First Amendment concern. If it were, an O’Brien style analysis 
would be appropriate. However, the Buckley Court clearly re-
jected this approach.81  
                                                                                    
 77. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 78. Id.  
 79. Id. at 377 (holding that, in combined cases, “a governmental regula-
tion is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Gov-
ernment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if 
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no 
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest”).  
 80. Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 840 (D.C. Cir. 1975), overruled by 424 
U.S. 1 (1976). 
 81. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16, 21 (noting that contribution limitations “in-
volve[ ] little direct restraint on [the contributor’s] political communication” 
because the restriction still “permits the symbolic expression of support evi-
denced by a contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor’s 
freedom to discuss candidates and issues”). 
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In fact, it is not at all clear that the Buckley Court really 
treats giving and spending of money as speech because it is ex-
pressive, though it appears to endorse this rationale for doing 
so.82 Explaining its reason for rejecting the O’Brien approach, 
the Buckley Court says the following: “Some forms of communi-
cation made possible by the giving and spending of money in-
volve speech alone, some involve conduct primarily, and some 
involve a combination of the two.”83 Speech that is made possi-
ble by money is speech that is, in this Article’s terms, facili-
tated by money. 
In sum, giving and spending money are not expressive 
enough to warrant First Amendment protection as speech. If 
they were, surely this expression is mixed with conduct such 
that an O’Brien test should apply. But as the Court suggests in 
the language above, the strongest argument for First Amend-
ment protection for giving and spending money comes from the 
way in which money “makes possible” or facilitates speech.84 
Part II.B addresses that argument. Before turning to that dis-
cussion, it is worth briefly describing the trouble that the Buck-
ley Court’s approach has spawned.  
In Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, individuals inter-
ested in contributing to the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) brought a 
First Amendment challenge to the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act of 1996, which criminalized such contribu-
tions.85 Relying heavily on Buckley, the plaintiffs in Humani-
tarian Law Project argued that “providing money to organiza-
tions engaged in political expression is itself both political ex-
pression and association,”86 because giving money to political 
organizations is itself expressive. While the Ninth Circuit re-
jected the plaintiffs’ claim, this outcome was made more diffi-
cult by the Buckley holding. This case ultimately reached the 
Supreme Court, but when it did, plaintiffs only challenged 
whether the law’s application to certain specified activities, not 
including giving money, rendered it unconstitutional.87  
                                                                                    
 82. Id. at 21. 
 83. Id. at 16 (emphasis added). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
 86. Id. at 1134. 
 87. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2708–09, 2716 
(2010) (explaining that plaintiffs “do not challenge [the law] . . . in all their 
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The Supreme Court case did not consider whether giving 
money to terrorist organizations can be prohibited consistent 
with the First Amendment. Both the majority and dissent in 
Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project assume that this form of 
“material support” clearly may be forbidden by Congress.88 On-
ly the more speech-like activities of advising and training raise 
challenging issues.89 But this conclusion should not be obvious 
under the line of campaign finance cases that began with Buck-
ley. While the Court in Buckley does sustain contribution lim-
its, it is careful to stress that giving money is protected First 
Amendment activity and to imply thereby that an outright ban 
on giving would not be acceptable.90 Why then is an outright 
ban on giving to terrorist organizations so easy to dispose of? 
While this result is surely correct—Congress should be able to 
ban giving money to terrorist organizations—it is not easy to 
reach this result under our campaign finance doctrine. 
The plaintiffs had a colorable argument that giving money 
to designated organizations is protected by the First Amend-
ment because Buckley held that giving money to political can-
didates is expressive enough to make the First Amendment rel-
evant.91 The Ninth Circuit could not distinguish Buckley on the 
grounds that those contributions were to respectable political 
candidates and these are to terrorist organizations. If giving 
money is speech, then the plaintiffs are surely entitled to ex-
press their support, even for noxious views. Instead, Judge Ko-
zinski, author of the Ninth Circuit decision, explained that 
while “the First Amendment protects the expressive component 
of seeking and donating funds, expressive conduct receives sig-
nificantly less protection than pure speech.”92 On these 
grounds, the Ninth Circuit concluded that “[t]he government 
may thus regulate contributions to organizations that engage 
in lawful—but non-speech related—activities. And it may cer-
tainly regulate contributions to organizations performing un-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
applications,” rather “plaintiffs claim that § 2339B is invalid to the extent it 
prohibits them from engaging in certain specified activities”).  
 88. Id. at 2725–26, 2735. 
 89. Id. at 2725–26, 2729, 2735, 2739. 
 90. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
 91. See id.  
 92. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 1130, 1134–35 (9th Cir. 
2000) (citing Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406 (1989)); see also United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968)).  
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lawful or harmful activities, even though such contributions 
may also express the donor’s feelings about the recipient.”93  
This discussion sounds reasonable unless one probes a bit 
more deeply. Giving money can be expressive, just as any ac-
tion can be expressive. The question is whether giving money to 
a political organization is expressive enough to call the First 
Amendment into play. On the one hand, Judge Kozinski is say-
ing (in part because he has to, following Buckley) that giving 
money to a political organization is expressive enough to pass 
that hurdle (“the First Amendment protects the expressive 
component of seeking and donating funds”).94 On the other 
hand, because the expressive action is conduct, the government 
may “regulate” it.95 This conclusion too is consistent with Buck-
ley as the Supreme Court sustained limitations on campaign 
contributions. But Humanitarian Law Project involves not 
merely a limitation but instead an outright ban.96 The law at 
issue forbids, subject to serious criminal penalties, any materi-
al support for terrorist organizations.97 In what sense, then, 
has the expressive dimension of donating money in fact been 
protected? While the Ninth Circuit opinion pays lip service to 
Buckley’s holding that donating money itself is expressive 
enough to call the First Amendment into play, it treats the case 
as one in which there is no real First Amendment value at 
stake.98 Supporters of the PKK and the LTTE can speak by 
supporting their favored organization in any way using words. 
What they cannot do is express their support by giving money.  
B. THE FACILITATIVE AND INCENTIVIZING FUNCTIONS OF 
MONEY AND THEIR FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
Spending money facilitates speech. This is the central rea-
son offered by the Supreme Court in Buckley for finding that 
                                                                                    
 93. Id. at 1135. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in this case to de-
termine if the term “material support” is unconstitutionally vague. Humanitar-
ian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 927–28 (9th Cir. 2009), cert. 
granted sub nom. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 48 (2009).  
 94. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F. 3d 1130, 1134 (9th Cir. 
2000) (emphasis added). 
 95. Id. at 1135 (“[T]he material support restriction here does not warrant 
strict scrutiny because it is not aimed at interfering with the expressive com-
ponent of their conduct but at stopping aid to terrorist groups.”). 
 96. Id. at 1132–33. 
 97. Id. 
 98. See id. at 1135–36. These conclusions are not disturbed by anything in 
the Supreme Court’s opinion.  
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restrictions on spending violate the First Amendment.99 The 
Court in Buckley argued that the Act imposed “direct quantity 
restrictions on political communication and association” be-
cause a “restriction on the amount of money a person or group 
can spend on political expression during a campaign necessari-
ly reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number 
of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size 
of the audience reached.”100 A spending limit thus directly re-
stricts speech because less money will lead to less speech. The 
reason that less money will yield less speech is because speech 
costs money: “virtually every means of communicating ideas in 
today’s mass society requires the expenditure of money,”101 or 
so the Court argues. Giving money facilitates speech too but in 
a more mediated fashion. Giving money facilitates the speech of 
the person or entity to whom it is given. 
This section challenges the argument described above. 
While money surely facilitates speech, the facilitative function 
of money is not sufficient to show that restrictions on giving 
and spending money constitute restrictions on speech. Instead, 
I argue that while the fact that money helps people to speak is 
relevant to the issue of whether restrictions on giving and 
spending money restrict speech, the question is complex and 
involves consideration of other important factors. Money facili-
tates the exercise of many other rights as well. Sometimes 
spending money in connection with a right is treated as a part 
of the right, and sometimes it is not. When we note this fact, we 
see that a more comprehensive account is necessary to deter-
mine when the right to spend or give money should be treated 
as part of a First Amendment right. Spending money surely 
facilitates speech—about that the Buckley Court is right. But to 
move from the obviously true claim that money facilitates 
speech to the controversial claim that restrictions on spending 
money are restrictions on speech requires much more.  
This Part begins with a discussion of two examples—
abortion and voting—to show that constitutional law can be 
read to sometimes protect spending money in connection with a 
constitutionally protected right and sometimes not. These ex-
amples together illustrate that the fact that money facilitates 
or incentivizes the exercise of a right is not sufficient to show 
that giving and spending are protected as part of a right. This 
                                                                                    
 99. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 16 (1976). 
 100. Id. at 18–19. 
 101. Id. at 19. 
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Part then proceeds to catalogue several other constitutionally 
protected rights with regard to which giving and spending 
money is not, or is not always, seen as part of right’s penumbra. 
This catalogue of rights and their connection to money serves 
two purposes. First, it helps to emphasize that using money to 
effectuate a right is often permissibly restricted. Second, it sug-
gests an account of when and why this might be the case. Part 
III then presents this account.  
1. Facilitation Is Not Sufficient: Abortion and Voting 
The right to abort a previable fetus first affirmed in Roe v. 
Wade102 and later reaffirmed in Planned Parenthood of South-
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey103 protects the right to a medical 
service. While it has never been litigated, it seems clear that 
this right would require invalidation of a law restricting a 
woman’s ability to pay for an abortion. Why is this? In the 
United States, medical services are distributed via the market. 
To obtain most medical services, one must either be able to pay, 
have insurance (private or public) that provides payment to the 
provider, be at a hospital with an emergency medical condition 
requiring immediate stabilization,104 or be offered charity care. 
While historically many abortions have been provided outside 
of the sphere of medical services—provided by friends or done 
to oneself—it is precisely the availability of abortion as a medi-
cal service that was afforded constitutional protection in Roe 
and its progeny.105 If medical services are distributed via the 
market, then the ability to obtain an abortion must include the 
ability to pay a service provider if the protected right is to be 
exercised at all.  
This commitment to the view that medical services, and in 
particular the provision of an abortion, are to be distributed by 
market principles is enshrined both by our current practice and 
in current constitutional law. The Supreme Court has consist-
ently held that the state has no obligation to pay for abortions, 
even when it is willing to pay for childbirth-related expenses,106 
                                                                                    
 102. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973). 
 103. 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
 104. The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act requires hospitals 
to stabilize emergency patients before turning them away. 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395dd(b)(1) (2006). 
 105. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 166 (“[T]he abortion decision in all its aspects is 
inherently, and primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it 
must rest with the physician.”). 
 106. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 469–70 (1977). 
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and even when abortions are medically necessary.107 These fac-
tors, that abortion is a medical service, that abortions are, for 
the most part, only available to those who can pay, and that 
there is no public provision of this service, together create the 
conditions that determine that the right to spend money to buy 
an abortion should be considered an integral part of the right to 
abortion itself. 
Recently enacted federal legislation alters the way that 
health insurance and health care is treated in our country.108 
However, it is unnecessary to decide whether this law is best 
viewed as transforming medical care from a commodity distrib-
uted via the market to a different sort of good, as the law ex-
plicitly exempts nontherapeutic abortions from its purview.109 
Thus, abortion remains a good to be distributed via the market. 
The right to spend one’s money to obtain an abortion therefore 
must be treated as part of the right to abort a nonviable fetus.  
Next, consider the right to vote. Should the right to vote be 
understood to include the right to spend money in connection 
with voting? Our Constitution protects the right to vote via 
several constitutional provisions including the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause;110 the Fifteenth 
Amendment111 (no denials based on race); the Nineteenth 
Amendment112 (no denials based on sex); the Twenty-Fourth 
Amendment113 (prohibiting poll taxes in federal elections); and 
the Twenty-Sixth Amendment114 (no denials to citizens eight-
een and over). Nonetheless, federal law prohibits people from 
buying or selling votes.115 In other words, the right to vote does 
not include the right to spend money to induce others to vote as 
one prefers. And rightly so. In fact, it seems odd to suggest that 
the right to vote should include the right to buy someone else’s 
vote. But why not? The reason this suggestion is odd is that the 
various laws and constitutional provisions just mentioned 
                                                                                    
 107. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326–27 (1980) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of a law denying public funding for medically necessary abortions 
except where necessary to save the life of the mother).  
 108. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 
Stat. 119 (2010). 
 109. Id. § 1303(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 168–69.  
 110. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2. 
 111. Id. amend. XV, § 1. 
 112. Id. amend. XIX. 
 113. Id. amend. XXIV, § 1. 
 114. Id. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
 115. 18 U.S.C. § 597 (2006). 
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make the vote something the government distributes via non-
market mechanisms, and thus, the right to give or spend mon-
ey in connection with voting seems to conflict with how we un-
derstand what the vote is.116 It is not simply the “one person, 
one vote” idea affirmed in Reynolds v. Sims117 that is relevant 
here. After all, each person could have one vote and yet be free-
ly able to trade that vote for money or anything else that she 
values. Rather, laws that forbid the buying and selling of votes 
instantiate the view that the sphere of voting should be sepa-
rated and protected from the sphere of money. This wall of sep-
aration between voting and money is at the heart of the rejec-
tion of poll taxes in federal elections enshrined in the Twenty-
Fourth Amendment, the similar rejection of poll taxes in state 
elections in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,118 and 
of property ownership requirements in Kramer v. Union Free 
School District.119  
Nor can one pay money to another person simply to vote, 
as contrasted with paying someone money to vote a particular 
way or for a particular candidate. Federal law prohibits paying 
a person “either to vote or withhold his vote.”120 Voter turnout 
is often lamentably low.121 Paying voters to come to the polls 
would likely increase voter participation, yet one cannot pay 
voters to vote. 
The right to abort an early fetus thus likely includes the 
penumbral right to spend money to effectuate the right. The 
right to vote does not. The two examples together demonstrate 
that constitutional rights do not always include the right to 
give and spend money to effectuate them. Yet spending money 
would facilitate and incentivize the exercise of both rights. 
Thus, the fact that spending money facilitates or incentivizes 
the exercise of a right is insufficient to show that a right entails 
a penumbral right to spend money. Moreover, the contrast be-
tween the two examples suggests that the key to when a right 
does include the right to spend money may relate to whether 
                                                                                    
 116. This account draws obviously from Michael Walzer’s important book, 
Spheres of Justice. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983).  
 117. 377 U.S. 533, 558 (1964). 
 118. 383 U.S. 663, 665–66 (1966). 
 119. 395 U.S. 621, 633 (1969).  
 120. 18 U.S.C. § 597.  
 121. Michael Falcone, One More Round of Voting, as Electors Do Their Du-
ty, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2008, at A18, available at 2008 WL 24053602 (noting 
that 61.6 percent of Americans eligible to vote actually voted in the 2008 Oba-
ma-McCain election, the highest turnout since 1968). 
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goods used to effectuate the right are distributed via the mar-
ket. The next section catalogues other constitutionally pro-
tected rights that are also unlikely to include the penumbral 
right to give or spend money to test this hypothesis.  
2. Constitutional Rights Not Generating a Right to Give or 
Spend Money 
a. The Right to Direct One’s Medical Care 
The right to direct one’s medical care is a plausible recon-
struction of the Supreme Court’s opinions in Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Dept. of Health122 and Washington v. Glucks-
berg.123 In fact, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court 
in Glucksberg, grounds the right of a competent person to 
refuse life-sustaining treatment, merely assumed in Cruzan 
but acknowledged in Glucksberg, on the “long legal tradition 
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment.”124 That long legal tradition, codified in requirements of 
informed consent to medical treatment, also requires physi-
cians to inform patients of relevant treatment options and re-
spect the choice of patients regarding which to pursue.125 In 
that sense, this right encompasses not simply the right to 
refuse treatment but also the right to choose treatment among 
those offered to the patient.  
However, this right to direct one’s medical care likely does 
not include the right to spend money to obtain the care one de-
sires in all contexts. One may not buy (or sell) organs for trans-
plant.126 Notwithstanding the fact that there is a serious short-
                                                                                    
 122. 497 U.S. 261, 279–80 (1990) (assuming the right of a competent per-
son to “refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition,” while upholding Missouri’s 
right to insist that “evidence of the incompetent’s wishes as to the withdrawal 
of treatment be proved by clear and convincing evidence”).  
 123. 521 U.S. 702, 709 (1997) (upholding a law prohibiting assisted suicide 
where the state also protects a patient’s right to refuse or demand the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment).  
 124. Id. at 725. 
 125. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (stating that the “notion of bodily integri-
ty has been embodied in the requirement that informed consent is generally 
required for medical treatment,” and that “[t]he informed consent doctrine has 
become firmly entrenched in American tort law”); AM. MED. ASS’N, CODE OF 
MED. ETHICS 10.01(1)–(2) (1993) (stating that patients have the right to re-
ceive information on treatment and alternatives to treatment and the right to 
refuse recommended treatment). 
 126. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2006) (prohibiting organ sales). 
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age of organs available for transplant,127 laws forbid paying 
money for organs.128 If the law permitted organs for transplant 
to be bought and sold, this would likely increase the supply of 
organs available for transplant and surely would facilitate the 
ability of a person with the necessary funds to obtain one. Be-
cause the transplant lists are long, and the medical conditions 
necessitating transplant can be life-threatening, the ability to 
buy an organ could save one’s life. Nonetheless, most assume 
that the constitutional right to direct one’s medical care does 
not include the right to pay for an organ.129  
b. Procreative Liberty 
The right of a couple, married or single, and later a wom-
an, in consultation with her doctor, to decide whether to “bear 
or beget a child”130 has been protected in a line of substantive 
due process cases beginning with Griswold v. Connecticut131 
and running through Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey.132 The understanding of this right, as it 
has evolved in the case law, begins by drawing a distinction 
between laws that prohibit the use as compared to the sale of 
contraceptives. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Gris-
wold, emphasized that the Connecticut law in question was 
particularly odious because it “forbid[s] . . . . the use of contra-
ceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale.”133 
While the right to buy and sell contraceptives is later protected 
in Carey v. Population Services International,134 it is probably 
not accidental that the strongest case in which to begin to artic-
                                                                                    
 127. As of September 24, 2010, 108,725 people were waiting for organ 
transplants. ORGANDONOR.GOV, http://www.organdonor.gov (last visited Nov. 
20, 2010). 
 128. 42 U.S.C. § 274e. 
 129. Eugene Volokh argues in a provocative article that these restrictions 
should be abolished. See generally Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Pro-
hibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REV. 
1813, 1832–46 (2007). Volokh argues that the right to self-defense ought to be 
understood to include the right to medical self-defense. Id. at 1824–28. 
 130. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972).  
 131. 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (striking down a state law that prohibited 
the use of contraceptives as it applied to a married couple). 
 132. 505 U.S. 833, 845–46 (1992) (upholding a woman’s right to decide to 
abort a nonviable fetus without undue burden). This right was limited some-
what in Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 132 (2007), which permitted a state 
to outlaw one method of abortion, termed “partial-birth abortion,” used in the 
context of late-term abortions that are not medically necessary.  
 133. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. 
 134. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).  
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ulate this right is not only one in which the plaintiffs asserting 
a right are married couples, but also where it is the use, rather 
than the sale, of contraceptives that is at issue.  
The right to privacy the Court first articulated in Griswold 
develops into a right to procreative liberty. In Casey, the plural-
ity describes the right in this way: “the Constitution places lim-
its on a State’s right to interfere with a person’s most basic de-
cisions about family and parenthood.”135 Nonetheless, the buy-
ing and selling of babies is prohibited in every state.136 Given 
the low supply of healthy infants, many infertile couples might 
welcome the increased opportunity to obtain such a child for 
adoption that legalizing the payment of money for a baby would 
produce.137 Yet, these laws are not controversial. The fact that 
babies are in short supply in this country, and that allowing 
the payment of money for them would provide incentives for 
people to sell and would facilitate the exercise of a person’s 
right to decide to become a parent, hardly seems much of an 
argument for striking down such laws. There is a constitution-
ally protected right to procreative liberty but it does not include 
the right to buy or sell a baby.  
c. Privacy as Sexual Intimacy 
Lawrence v. Texas arguably established a right to be free 
from governmental intrusions into decisions about sexual inti-
macy.138 The language of the Court in this case is broad. The 
Court notes that there is “an emerging awareness that liberty 
gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to 
conduct their private lives in matters pertaining to sex.”139 
Moreover, the Court argues that “[i]t suffices for us to acknowl-
edge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in 
the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still 
retain their dignity as free persons.”140 And yet, in this same 
opinion, the Court finds no difficulty in clearly rejecting any 
                                                                                    
 135. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849. 
 136. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 109.311(3) (2003) (“No person shall charge, 
accept or pay or offer to charge, accept or pay a fee for locating a minor child 
for adoption or for locating another person to adopt a minor child . . . .”). 
 137. See Elisabeth M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the 
Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 323, 323–24 (1978) (discussing how the de-
mand for babies has resulted in a black market). 
 138. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 563, 579 (2003) (striking down a 
Texas law that prohibited sex between same-sex partners and other forms of 
what the statute termed “deviate sexual intercourse”). 
 139. Id. at 572. 
 140. Id. at 567. 
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implications from this line of reasoning for the continued valid-
ity of laws criminalizing sexual intimacy for pay—
prostitution.141 The right to sexual intimacy protected by Law-
rence simply does not include within its bounds, as the Court 
currently understands them, the right to engage in paid sexual 
intimacy in one’s own home. In other words, the right at is-
sue—freedom from intrusion into sexual intimacy in the 
home—does not include the right to spend money in connection 
with this right.  
3. Framing the Relationship Between Money and Rights 
When do constitutionally protected rights include a right to 
spend money to effectuate them? Campaign finance case law 
from Buckley to Citizens United is inadequate in failing to ad-
dress the question or provide a reason that the First Amend-
ment right of free speech, exercised in connection with elec-
tions, includes a right to give and spend money. One central 
aim of this Article is to broaden the lens through which courts 
and commentators approach campaign finance cases. Rather 
than focusing on the connection between money and speech on 
its own, one ought to examine the connection between money 
and rights more generally. Money facilitates and incentivizes 
the exercise of most rights, including speech. But this fact alone 
does not show that restrictions on giving and spending money 
to exercise a right constitute restrictions on that right. Part I 
and this Part established this much. The task now is to develop 
an alternative account.  
One might think that the answer to the question of when 
constitutionally protected rights include penumbral rights to 
spend money lies in how one defines the protected right itself. 
Take the example of the right to sexual intimacy protected in 
Lawrence.142 The right at issue in Lawrence, one might say, is 
not the right to sexual intimacy, but rather the right to form an 
intimate personal relationship, that one can express sexually as 
well as in other ways. If that is correct, then sex-for-pay would 
not be included within the ambit of the right to sexual intima-
cy, as the sex you have to pay for is not the expression of an 
intimate personal bond.143 One could make a similar argument 
                                                                                    
 141. Id. at 578 (noting that this case “does not involve public conduct or pros-
titution,” thereby suggesting that if it did, the same analysis would not apply).  
 142. See supra notes 138–41 and accompanying text. 
 143. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (defending the right in these terms 
by stating that “[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct 
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about why votes cannot be bought and sold. The right to vote 
just is the right to express one’s political preference. If one sells 
that vote, it is no longer an expression of preference or contri-
bution to democratic decisionmaking, but instead simply a 
thing of value that one can trade for something else one values 
more.144  
While seemingly promising, this approach fails to capture 
widely shared intuitions about which rights should be under-
stood to include the right to spend money in connection with 
their exercise and which should not. Consider the example of 
laws forbidding the sale of organs. Eugene Volokh has argued 
that the right to self-defense includes the right to medical self-
defense.145 This right, he argues, ought to be understood to in-
clude the right to buy organs.146 If we accept Volokh’s admitted-
ly controversial assertion that there is a right to medical self-
defense, must we also accept that it includes the right to buy 
organs to save one’s life? In considering the arguments against 
this view, Volokh stresses that organs are different from sex or 
friendship, love and prizes, in that buying and selling of these 
changes their nature; commodifying them corrupts them. But 
not so of organs, Volokh argues: “Love, friendship, and prizes 
can’t properly be gotten for money because paid-for love, friend-
ship, and prizes are not ‘love,’ ‘friendship,’ and ‘prizes’ as we 
define the terms. But a paid-for kidney is a kidney, just as a 
paid-for transplant operation is a transplant operation.”147 If 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring”).  
 144. Edward Foley makes an argument of this kind for the claim that 
people should understand the Constitution to require that each voter has an 
equal amount of money to spend in connection with campaigns. He calls this 
the “equal-dollars-per-voter” principle. Edward B. Foley, Equal-Dollars-Per-
Voter: A Constitutional Principle of Campaign Finance, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 
1204, 1204 (1994). According to his view, these dollars would be nontransfera-
ble in just the way that votes are today. Foley explains, 
[e]ach citizen should receive, along with an equal vote, an equal sum 
of money for purposes of participating in the electoral process. No cit-
izens should be free to purchase another’s electoral funds just because 
the one has a greater interest in electoral politics than another. Con-
versely, no citizen should be free to sell her electoral funds to another 
just because she has less of an interest in participation. Instead, par-
ticipation in the electoral process should be recognized as a distinc-
tively communal activity, to which all must have an equal right, so 
that the results of the process may be considered fair. 
Id. at 1236–37. 
 145. Volokh, supra note 129, at 1815. 
 146. Id. at 1832–45. 
 147. Id. at 1844.  
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the test for whether a constitutionally protected right includes 
the right to spend money to effectuate it reduces to the question 
of whether the right in question is changed or corrupted by its 
connection with money, then Volokh has a good argument for 
the right to buy and sell organs. This seems too quick, howev-
er.148 The right to medical self-defense (if it exists) or to direct 
one’s medical care need not include the right to buy and sell 
organs even though organs are still organs even if paid for. 
Briefly, one might think that organs ought to be distributed 
according to principles of medical need and that choices about 
whether to donate organs ought not to be motivated by mon-
ey.149 If so, this suggests something important about when and 
why a constitutionally protected right ought to include the 
right to spend money as a part of the protected liberty at issue. 
It is to that issue that this Article now turns.  
III.  MONEY AND RIGHTS: A POSITIVE ACCOUNT   
The previous section established that while spending mon-
ey facilitates expression, incentivizes expression, and can itself 
be expressive, these facts alone are insufficient to establish that 
restrictions on giving and spending money are restrictions on 
speech. Rather, only the expressive dimension of giving and 
spending money is uniquely related to the First Amendment. 
Moreover, while giving and spending money is expressive, it is 
usually not expressive enough to warrant First Amendment 
protection. Spending money also both facilitates speech and 
provides incentives to speak. However, as I surveyed briefly 
above, spending money also facilitates and incentivizes the ex-
ercise of other constitutionally protected rights as well as the 
fulfillment of countless interests.150 This is because money is a 
general purpose good, useful in the attainment of many other 
goods and the exercise of many rights. Sometimes the right to 
give and spend money in connection with the exercise of a right 
is protected as part of the right itself and sometimes it is not. 
This observation leads to two conclusions. First, merely noting 
that spending money facilitates the exercise of a right is not 
enough to establish that spending money in connection with 
                                                                                    
 148. Of course, Volokh himself considers other arguments. See id. at  
1837–45. 
 149. Volokh considers and rejects these arguments. See id. at 1837–45 
(considering arguments for why organ donation choices should not be moti-
vated by money).  
 150. See supra Part I.A–B. 
  
984 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [95:953 
 
the right should be understood as falling within the ambit of 
the right itself. Second, that being so, we need a theory to ex-
plain and justify when we ought to protect money spending in 
connection with a right as part of that right and when not to do 
so.  
A. SEPARATE “SPHERES”151 
How should one analyze the question of when constitution-
ally protected rights include the right to spend money? Ap-
proaching this as a question of constitutional law, there are two 
possible answers to this question. First, the Constitution may 
provide an answer to this question in the case of some or all 
rights.152 The process of constitutional interpretation would 
then determine which rights include the right to spend money 
and which do not. Alternatively, the Constitution could be ag-
nostic on this point. If so, democratic decisionmakers would be 
free to determine if people may spend money in exercising their 
constitutionally protected rights.153 This section provides an 
argument for the agnostic view.  
The market provides one method for distributing goods. 
Goods are “distributed” in the market by ability and willing-
                                                                                    
 151. “Spheres” is a reference to Walzer’s book, Spheres of Justice. WALZER, 
supra note 116. Walzer argues that inequalities in one sphere, like wealth, 
educational achievement, politics, etc., ought not to translate into inequalities 
in other spheres. See generally id. Sanford Levinson also notes that Walzer’s 
views have interesting implications for campaign finance controversies but 
argues against the direction to which Walzer’s views would point. See Sanford 
Levinson, Regulating Campaign Activity: The New Road to Contradiction?, 83 
MICH. L. REV. 939, 946 (1985) (reviewing ELIZABETH DREW, POLITICS AND 
MONEY: THE NEW ROAD TO CORRUPTION (1983)). Levinson notes that Walzer’s 
book is oddly silent about campaign finance controversies. Id. at 946, n.32. 
 152. Edward Foley adopts this view, at least with regard to the right to 
spend money in connection with election-related speech. Foley, supra note 144, 
at 1225. Mark Graber appears to as well. See generally MARK A. GRABER, 
TRANSFORMING FREE SPEECH: THE AMBIGUOUS LEGACY OF CIVIL 
LIBERTARIANISM 26–44 (1991). 
 153. Although I have drawn on Michael Walzer’s work in this Article, we 
address the question of the appropriate distributive scheme of various goods in 
different ways. In Walzer’s view, the correct distributive principle for particu-
lar goods is determined by the social meaning of that good. See WALZER, supra 
note 116, at 6 (“[D]ifferent social goods ought to be distributed for different 
reasons, in accordance with different procedures, by different agents; and that 
all these differences derive from different understandings of the social goods 
themselves—the inevitable product of historical and cultural particularism.”). 
What this position would entail in the context of a constitutional democracy is 
not clear. Walzer may intend that democratic decisionmakers determine the 
social meanings of various goods and thus the distributive principles they give 
rise to. Or, he may not.  
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ness to pay. The fact that the market is a powerful and impor-
tant method for the allocation of resources need not imply that 
it is the only distributive mechanism. In fact, many goods are 
distributed according to other principles. As Michael Walzer 
notes,  
[w]hat should and should not be up for sale is something men and 
women always have to decide and have decided in many different 
ways. Throughout history, the market has been one of the most im-
portant mechanisms for the distribution of social goods; but it has 
never been, it nowhere is today, a complete distributive system.154  
Love and friendship are distributed according to attraction and 
affection. Organs are distributed according to medical need. 
Votes are distributed according to age and citizenship. Citizen-
ship is distributed according to birth and blood.155  
The fact that there are many ways to distribute different 
goods provides a powerful reason to let democratic decision-
makers decide the appropriate distributive principles for differ-
ent types of goods. We define ourselves as a community and 
express our values by determining which goods are distributed 
via which principles, and in particular by fixing the reach of the 
market. On the other hand, allowing democratic decisionmak-
ers to decide when money can be used to exercise rights could 
allow majorities to curtail rights by making their exercise ex-
tremely difficult. For example, in the wake of the Court’s affir-
mation of the right to abort a nonviable fetus,156 a state could 
forbid women from paying for abortion services. The view I 
propose below will accommodate both concerns, leaving demo-
cratic decisionmakers wide latitude in determining which goods 
ought to be distributed via which principles, while protecting 
the rights themselves from encroachment by democratically 
enacted laws.  
Briefly, the view proposed is this. The Constitution does 
not determine the appropriate distributive mechanism for vari-
ous types of goods. Therefore, democratic decisionmakers are 
free to decide that organs, babies, or citizenship should not be 
for sale. But there are limits which will safeguard rights from 
majority will. If a constitutional right depends on a good that is 
distributed via the market, then the right must be understood 
                                                                                    
 154. WALZER, supra note 116, at 4. 
 155. See generally AYELET SHACHAR, THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: 
CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009) (critiquing our global system of 
citizenship based on birthright). 
 156. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992) 
(plurality opinion). 
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to include the right to spend money to exercise it. If a constitu-
tional right depends on a good that democratic decisionmakers 
have determined is not to be distributed via the market, then 
the right ought not to be understood to include the right to 
spend money to exercise it.  
The argument for this account is presented below and 
proceeds as follows. Part B brings the lessons of Lochner to 
bear. It argues that appropriate caution about attributing any 
particular economic theory to our Constitution provides a rea-
son to leave to democratic decisionmakers the decision about 
which goods ought and ought not to be distributed via the mar-
ket. Part C then describes the implications of this account for 
campaign finance regulation. Part D considers objections to the 
view presented. Part E returns to the aforementioned challenge 
that laws restricting giving and spending money in campaigns 
target speech and raise important First Amendment issues for 
this reason. Finally, Part F shows how the account would treat 
some of the cases Volokh offered as challenges.  
B. THE MARKETPLACE OF IDEAS: METAPHOR OR REALITY? 
Our current constitutional doctrine treats economic deci-
sions by the elected branches of government deferentially. The 
lesson of the Lochner era is that this deference is appropriate, 
as the constitution does not adopt any particular economic 
theory.157 Societies distribute some goods via markets and some 
not. Computers and clothes are distributed via the market, but 
babies and organs are not. Deciding which goods will be distrib-
uted via which principles is a basic question for a society in a 
way that is analogous to the decision about which economic 
theory to endorse; it therefore ought to be left to democratic de-
cisionmakers. This is an important lesson to draw from the re-
jection of Lochner.158 Recognizing the legislature’s proper role 
                                                                                    
 157. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissent-
ing) (“[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.”). 
 158. In the 1990s, critics of then-current First Amendment doctrine, in-
cluding limitations on Congress’s ability to regulate campaign finance, called 
for a “New Deal” for the First Amendment. Cass R. Sunstein, Free Speech 
Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 263–300 (1992); accord J.M. Balkin, Some Real-
ism About Pluralism: Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 
DUKE L.J. 375, 386; Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA 
L. REV. 1405, 1408 (1986). The thrust of their critique was that First Amend-
ment doctrine mistakenly treats current distributions of speaking power as 
neutral and prepolitical in much the same way as the Lochner-era Supreme 
Court saw then-current distributions of wealth. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra, at 
273. But, these critics argue, just as distributions of economic power result 
  
2011] MONEY TALKS 987 
 
in determining the method of distribution for various types of 
goods helps to answer the question about money and rights.  
Where a good is distributed via the market, as abortion 
services are, a right which depends on that good must be inter-
preted to include within its penumbra the right to spend money 
to effectuate it. So, for example, if individuals have a right to 
own handguns, they must have a right to buy bullets. On the 
other hand, if the legislature determines that the good in ques-
tion is not to be distributed via the market, then a right which 
depends on that good ought not to be interpreted to include the 
right to spend money to effectuate it. So, for example, the right 
to “bear or beget” a child does not include the right to buy ba-
bies, as children are not distributed via market principles.  
It is easy to see how this view accounts for the constitu-
tional permissibility of laws that restrict buying and selling of 
votes. It is not simply these particular laws that take voting out 
of the sphere of the market. Other laws provide an alternative 
distribution method for the vote. Principles of age, residency, 
and citizenship determine who has a vote in what election. 
These laws represent a permissible legislative choice that polit-
ical participation is not governed by market norms. As I have 
noted above, one could provide everyone a right to vote and still 
permit people to buy and sell these votes. But one need not. 
The ability to buy votes would facilitate the ability of some vot-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
from legal rules that advantage some over others, the ability to influence oth-
ers or to harm others with speech is a product of legal rights and legal rules as 
well. See, e.g., id. at 275. There is no neutral place to stand, these critics ar-
gue, and so one must forthrightly balance the speech interests of those whom 
speech regulation would harm, as compared with the speech-related interests 
of those whom speech regulation would benefit. See, e.g., Fiss, supra, at 1420. 
A “New Deal” for the First Amendment would likely leave much of this balanc-
ing to legislatures, just as the first “New Deal” meant that courts accorded 
strong deference to legislatures in balancing the pros and cons of various eco-
nomic policies. See, e.g., Balkin, supra, at 389. 
These First Amendment reformers, or “new speech regulators” as Kath-
leen Sullivan terms them, have engendered strong replies—from both the 
right and the left. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech and Unfree Markets, 42 
UCLA L. REV. 949, 954 (1995); accord Charles Fried, The New First Amend-
ment Jurisprudence: A Threat to Liberty, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 225, 226 (1992). 
These critiques range from assertions that exercises of state power are mean-
ingfully different from exercises of private power, see Fried, supra, at 236, to 
arguments that speech is different from economic activity such that there are 
good reasons to be especially wary of any restrictions on speech, see Sullivan, 
supra, at 955–56. It is an interesting debate, and one that is likely to continue 
for some time, in the academy if not in the courts. While I do not intend here 
to take a position in this debate, I raise it because the position I present below 
has important affinities with the “New Deal” approach, though it is signifi-
cantly more modest in its claims and thus perhaps less controversial.  
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ers to elect the candidate of their choice. Still, this is a “blocked 
exchange.”159 What we find in the context of voting are both 
laws that establish the nonmarket method for distribution and 
laws that forbid the market exchange. Together these clearly 
establish that Congress has determined that the vote is not a 
market commodity. The result of this permissible legislative 
choice about the appropriate distribution method for votes is 
that the right to vote does not include the right to spend money 
to effectuate it.  
Equally clearly, abortion services are a commodity to be 
bought and sold in the market. There is no public provision of 
abortion services. Poor people receiving government provided 
health services are generally not provided with abortions as 
part of those services.160 With these laws, Congress makes a 
choice to treat abortion services as a commodity and as such 
one to be distributed via the market. The result of this permiss-
ible legislative choice to treat abortion services as a commodity 
is that the right to abort a nonviable fetus must be understood 
to include the right to spend money to effectuate it. 
This approach provides democratic decisionmakers with 
latitude to determine which goods ought to be distributed via 
the market and which should not. At the same time, it also pro-
tects rights. It does so because the state cannot simply prohibit 
private expenditures unless there is an alternative method for 
distributing the good in question. For example, suppose a state 
passed a law that prohibited women from paying money to 
abortion providers. This law would violate the abortion right 
because it forbids payment for a good that is largely distributed 
via the market.161 The alternative to market distribution can be 
public provision, public funding, or something else. After all, 
                                                                                    
 159. WALZER, supra note 116, at 100–03. 
 160. E.g., State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP), 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1397ee(c)(7)(A) (2006) (“Payment shall not be made to a State under this 
section for any amount expended under the State plan to pay for any abortion 
or to assist in the purchase, in whole or in part, of health benefit coverage that 
includes coverage of abortion.”). Congress designed the SCHIP program to 
provide medical assistance to low-income children. Id. § 1397ee(a)(1). But see 
GUTTMACHER INST., STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF: STATE FUNDING OF ABORTION 
UNDER MEDICAID (2010), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/ 
spibs/spib_SFAM.pdf (noting that while federal funding cannot be used for 
abortions except in cases of rape, incest, or life endangerment, some states use 
their own money to fund abortions beyond what federal law provides). Cur-
rently, seventeen states provide Medicaid funding for most medically neces-
sary abortions. Id. 
 161. There are some providers who offer the service free of charge, but 
these are limited. 
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the state does not provide babies, yet their sale is restricted. 
Nonetheless, an entire scheme of laws (family law) regulate the 
distribution (using that term loosely) of babies. Babies belong 
to their genetic or adoptive parents, etc.162 Thus, merely pass-
ing a law that restricts spending in connection with a right is 
not enough to establish that democratic decisionmakers are 
taking the good in question out of market distribution. If it 
were, then all rights would be vulnerable. The legislature may 
provide that a good must be distributed via nonmarket prin-
ciples. But the legislature may not simply forbid using money 
to effectuate a right if no other nonmarket mechanisms of dis-
tribution exist.163 After McDonald v. Chicago,164 a state cannot 
avoid violation of the Second Amendment by banning the sale 
of hand guns or indeed even the sale of bullets.165  
                                                                                    
 162. I do not mean to suggest here that children are the property of their 
parents. I use the term “belong” here loosely to suggest that parents have pa-
rental rights—which include duties of care—with respect to children.  
 163. One might be tempted to put this point in terms of legislative inten-
tions or purposes—a method familiar in First Amendment doctrine. In that 
form, one would say that the legislature cannot aim to prevent the exercise of 
the right. Clearly, laws that forbid the sale of votes do not aim to suppress 
voting, but the hypothetical law forbidding payment for abortion services that 
a legislature enacted in a context where there is no other nonmarket mechan-
ism to obtain an abortion would likely have been adopted for precisely that 
reason. In general, I think it is a mistake to make legislative intentions rele-
vant to the permissibility of laws. But nothing turns on which way this point 
is articulated here, so a reader more comfortable with this approach can formu-
late the point in this manner. 
 164. McDonald v. Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3026 (2010) (holding that the 
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment, and thus that 
the decision in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008), is applic-
able to the states). 
 165. In the 1980s and 1990s, there were various attempts to ban and/or 
aggressively tax the sale of specific types of bullets, so-called cop-killer bullets 
in particular. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Just Bite the Bullets!, WASH. POST, 
Jan. 5, 1995, at A29 (arguing for “an energetic regime of licensure taxing and 
accounting” on bullets in order to decrease gun violence); see also Scott D. Dail-
ard, The Role of Ammunition in a Balanced Program of Gun Control: A Criti-
que of the Moynihan Bullet Bills, 20 J. LEGIS. 19, 23–24 (1994) (summarizing 
all of Senator Moynihan’s proposals for banning and/or taxing the sale of bul-
lets); Pierre Thomas, U.S. Review Targets Deadly New Bullets, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 12, 1993, at A4. While it may be permissible to ban the sale of specific 
types of bullets, I take it that neither Congress nor a state could ban the sale 
of all bullets, nor could it ban the sale of a type of bullet without making out 
that the bullet has special dangers or is used in a type of gun which itself 
could be banned. See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Un-
raveling Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 286–87 (2009) (arguing that the Hel-
ler decision raises a tremendous number of legal questions under the Second 
Amendment about the permissibility of gun regulations, including regulations 
on ammunition magazines and types of bullets). 
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C. IMPLICATIONS FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE RESTRICTIONS 
We now turn to campaign finance laws and ask whether 
the right of free speech should be understood to include the 
right to spend money to effectuate this right. According to the 
analysis presented here, the answer to this question will de-
pend on whether the legislature has determined that the goods 
necessary to effectuate the right are to be distributed via the 
market or via alternative distributive mechanisms. In the case 
of free speech, unlike abortion or voting, there are many goods 
that are useful to the exercise of the right: e.g., books, movies, 
pamphlets, and television and radio advertisements and pro-
grams. One possible way to approach the issue is to say that 
when Congress adopts campaign finance laws, in particular 
laws that restrict giving money to candidates and spending 
money on electioneering communications,166 it removes elec-
tioneering from the market economy. The relevant good, then, 
is electioneering. Where Congress also provides for public fund-
ing of an election, the claim that Congress has removed elec-
tioneering from the market is strongest. For example, suppose 
Congress were both to provide all presidential candidates 
(meeting certain eligibility requirements) with a specified 
amount of money to be spent in connection with the political 
campaign and simultaneously to forbid candidates from spend-
ing private money on these campaigns, while forbidding every-
one else from donating money to these candidates. The decision 
to fund the election constitutes a legislative choice that cam-
paigning ought not to depend on market-based principles. Pre-
sumably, there would be criteria to determine which candidates 
have amassed enough support to qualify for public funding. 
These principles would thus displace market principles as the 
method for distributing election funding.  
This hypothetical campaign finance law is merely an ex-
ample of one way in which Congress might remove electioneer-
ing from the market. This Article argues only that the First 
Amendment does not limit the ability of Congress and state 
legislatures to pass some forms of campaign finance reform. 
Bruce Ackerman and Ian Ayres offer an intriguing alternative 
                                                                                    
 166. The statute at issue in Citizens United, for example, defines election-
eering communications in the following way: “An electioneering communica-
tion is defined as ‘any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication’ that ‘refers 
to a clearly identified candidate for Federal office’ and is made within 30 days 
of a primary or 60 days of a general election.” Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 881 (2010) (quoting 2 U.S.C. § 434(f )(3)(A)). 
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approach.167 They propose that Congress provide all voters with 
a “Patriot” card with fifty patriot dollars. These dollars can be 
given to candidates of one’s choice but may not be traded, sold, 
or used on any other good. While Ackerman and Ayres describe 
their view as a hybrid of market and nonmarket norms,168 at its 
core it represents a method of segregating electioneering from 
the sphere of wealth. According to Ackerman and Ayres, the 
ability to participate in politics should be distributed to each 
registered voter roughly equally: “Patriot merely expands this 
equal voting principle into the domain of public discourse.”169 
Ackerman and Ayres, as well as others, make good norma-
tive arguments for the view that wealth ought not to influence 
politics and thus that Congress ought to segregate electioneer-
ing from the market. While I find these arguments quite per-
suasive, this Article’s claim does not rest on a normative argu-
ment of this kind. Rather, I argue here that the First Amend-
ment does not bar Congress or states from deciding to adopt 
such a scheme. The Constitution leaves open the question of 
the reach of the market and thus democratic decisionmakers 
are free to remove politics from its scope, if they so choose. 
A more complicated case is presented by those campaign 
finance laws that restrict contributions and expenditures while 
not providing for public financing at the same time.170 Such a 
                                                                                    
 167. BRUCE ACKERMAN & IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS: A NEW 
PARADIGM FOR CAMPAIGN FINANCE (2002).  
 168. They describe their aim in the following terms: “We are searching for 
policy hybrids that combine the best features of previously distinct breeds of 
social power: the electoral system and the market system.” Id. at 25. The as-
pect of the market that Ackerman and Ayres wish to retain, however, is not 
the influence of wealth but rather the decentralization and flexibility that it 
makes possible. Id. (explaining the combination as aimed to “marry the egali-
tarian ideals of the ballot box and the flexible response of the marketplace”).  
 169. Id. at 17. Their proposal includes other interesting features including, 
most significantly, secrecy. The amount of all donations above $200 would not 
be able to be disclosed. In this way, Ackerman and Ayres hope to disrupt the 
link between donations and access or favors. Id. at 25–44.  
 170. For example, current law restricts contributions on congressional elec-
tions without providing funding for these elections. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(3) 
(2006) (“The term ‘Federal office’ means the office of President or Vice Presi-
dent, or of Senator or Representative in, or Delegate or Resident Commission-
er to, the Congress.”); id. § 441a(a)(1)(A) (stating that no person shall make a 
contribution greater than $2000 “with respect to any election for Federal of-
fice”); R. SAM GARRETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33814, PUBLIC FINANCING 
OF CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS: BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS 1–2 (2007), 
available at http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/94355.pdf (discussing 
the history of failed proposals to extend public financing to congressional elec-
tions). Spending by candidates in these elections is not limited, since the 
Court’s holding in Buckley invalidated such limitations as a violation of the 
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regime does not clearly move electioneering from the market to 
the nonmarket domain. On the one hand, contribution limits 
cap the amount that inequalities in wealth can translate into 
inequalities in political influence. But on the other hand, since 
many people lack the resources to contribute at all, or, if they 
do contribute to campaigns, contribute far less than the legally 
permitted maximum amount, the political influence that con-
tributing to candidates entails is still, at least in part, treated 
as a market commodity. Expenditure limits more straightfor-
wardly move electioneering into the nonmarket realm. If each 
candidate may only spend a specified amount on her election, 
then the ability to persuade voters does not depend on one’s 
own wealth or the wealth of one’s supporters.171 Were the Court 
to adopt the analysis proposed in this Article, its decision would 
focus on these questions. Where public financing is combined 
with limitations on giving and spending money on election-
related activities, we have a clear case in which the legislature 
has determined that elections ought not to be influenced by 
wealth. Similarly, were Congress to adopt a different currency 
for campaign giving, like Ackerman and Ayres’s Patriot dollars, 
we also have a clear instance of moving electioneering out of 
the market sphere. In such cases, restrictions on giving and 
spending on elections are not restrictions on speech. Where it is 
less clear that the legislature is moving the activity outside of 
the market, it is consequently also less clear that these restric-
tions do not violate the right of free speech.  
As the above analysis illustrates, the approach this Article 
puts forward would require a court to focus on very different 
issues than does current campaign finance law. Courts must 
ask whether Congress or a state legislature has clearly adopted 
an approach that removes electioneering from the market. If so, 
restrictions on both giving and spending money in connection 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
First Amendment. I am here exploring how my theory would treat restrictions 
on both giving and spending in connection with campaigns where no public 
funding is provided.  
 171. Of course, this fact does not guarantee that winning the election will 
thus depend on relevant factors. Critics of campaign finance laws often point 
out that they benefit incumbents. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, The Curse of 
American Politics, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 17, 1996, at 19, 19 (“The importance 
of money in politics means political inequality as well. Contributors to both 
parties tend to favor congressional incumbents.”). Whether these laws are 
good or should be struck down on these grounds are entirely different ques-
tions than the one I address here. The argument I consider here is meant to 
refute the claim I call “C”—that laws that restrict giving and spending in con-
nection with campaigns constitute restrictions on speech and thus require 
heightened judicial review.  
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with the relevant elections ought not to be treated as restric-
tions on speech. Moreover, this approach provides Congress 
with guidance about what sort of legislative approach would 
pass constitutional muster. So long as Congress is willing to 
provide the resources necessary for electioneering and identify 
the relevant nonmarket criteria for their distribution, Congress 
may restrict both giving and spending in connection with elec-
tions. After all, the marketplace of ideas is a metaphor. One 
need not take the First Amendment as a command that free 
speech rights are tethered to the actual market. 
A decision by elected officials that electioneering ought not 
to be treated as a market commodity should not be confused 
with the view that electioneering resources must be distributed 
equally. There are many nonmarket principles of distribu-
tion.172 For example, today organs are distributed on the basis 
of need.173 Some commentators see the obvious alternative to 
the current system in which money translates into influence as 
one in which voters have an equal opportunity to influence poli-
tics. For example, Frank Pasquale argues for equality as the 
appropriate distributive principle for the domain of politics.174 
Building on John Rawls’s notion that each person is entitled to 
the “fair value of political liberties,” Pasquale argues that each 
person ought to have the same opportunity to influence poli-
tics.175 David Strauss has argued that in trying to get money 
out of politics, the real goal is equal political influence.176 He 
argues that if each person were equally well-off and could thus 
spend equally on giving to political candidates, one would no 
longer worry about campaign giving.177 In an article critical of 
                                                                                    
 172. Walzer identifies three primary distributive methods: free exchange, 
desert, and need. WALZER, supra note 116, at 21–26. 
 173. See The Matching Process—Waiting List, ORGANDONOR.GOV, http:// 
www.organdonor.gov/transplantation/matching_process.htm (last visited Nov. 
26, 2010) (explaining how the organ transplant waiting list is prioritized based 
on the urgency with which patients require an organ). 
 174. See Frank Pasquale, Reclaiming Egalitarianism in the Political Theory 
of Campaign Finance Reform, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 602 (arguing for the 
return to the egalitarian roots of the justification for campaign finance reform). 
 175. See id. at 601, 638 (arguing, based on Rawls, that the justification for 
campaign finance reform is “to assure that certain powerful groups do not ex-
ercise undue influence on its outcome”). 
 176. See David A. Strauss, Corruption, Equality, and Campaign Finance 
Reform, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1369, 1369 (1994) (“[P]eople who are willing and 
able to spend more money, it is said, should not have more influence over who 
is elected to office.”). 
 177. Id. at 1373 (“If equality is secured, then because campaign contribu-
tions are valuable only as a means to get votes, rewarding a legislator with a 
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this striving toward equality of political influence, Sanford Lev-
inson too sees the only alternative to the current system as one 
that aims at equality.178 Levinson argues that because “[m]oney 
is not the only socially useful resource that is unequally distri-
buted,”179 the goal of equalizing influence is doomed. People 
have different talents for influencing people and different 
amounts of free time to allocate to politics.180 
To say that electioneering should not be treated as a mar-
ket commodity is not to require that influence be distributed 
evenly. Levinson is surely right that it would be impractical to 
try to do so. Just listening to President Obama makes clear 
that oratory skill will make some candidates more influential 
than others. When the political branches decide to remove 
transplant organs from the market, they have a choice of possi-
ble allocative principles to use in its stead. The transplant list 
could be headed by those who first listed as in need of a trans-
plant, by those most likely to die soon, by those most likely to 
benefit, etc. The rejection of the market as the method of distri-
bution does not determine which of these principles should take 
its place. That decision is up to democratic decisionmakers, 
within some broad limits.181 Similarly, campaign finance laws 
need not aim at equal political influence in order for these laws 
to legitimately displace the market as the distributive mechan-
                                                                                                                                                                                   
contribution is, in important ways, similar to the unquestionably permissible 
practice of rewarding her with one’s vote.”).  
 178. See Levinson, supra note 151, at 945–48. Levinson rejects the project 
of equalization due, in great part, to its impracticability. 
 179. Id. at 948.  
 180. Perhaps in response to critiques such as Levinson’s, Pasquale de-
scribes how the emphasis on equality was displaced by a call for politics gov-
erned by fair conversational principles, a development he laments. See Pas-
quale, supra note 174, at 621–23 (characterizing the alternative emphasis as 
“The Deliberativist Detour”). This “Deliberativist Detour” is influenced by 
Jürgen Habermas. See JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 322–23 
(William Rehg trans., 1996) (describing the theories of deliberative politics and 
procedural democracy). An influential example of this Habermasian approach 
can be found in C. Edwin Baker’s work. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, Campaign 
Expenditures and Free Speech, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 3 (1998) (using 
Habermas’s theory of democracy to support the notion that campaigns are 
“part of the institutionalized electoral process rather than . . . the broader 
realm of unregulated political speech”). 
 181. Graber argues, following Walzer, that “the integrity of the political 
sphere is preserved when inequalities in political power reflect differences in 
the ‘rhetorical skill and organizational competence’ of those who seek that 
good.” GRABER, supra note 152, at 229 (citing WALZER, supra note 116, at 309). 
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ism. Thus, the fact that equality of political influence is an elu-
sive goal does not undermine the approach argued for here.  
The approach presented in this Article provides a frame-
work for analyzing whether the right to spend money in con-
nection with a constitutionally protected right ought to be seen 
as part of the penumbra of that right or not. As presented here, 
it offers only the broad outlines of how courts should address 
this question. Clearly, there is much that would need to be 
worked out about how this approach would resolve whether 
particular and detailed campaign finance laws sufficiently re-
move electioneering from the market so that restrictions on giv-
ing and spending on campaign communications should not be 
treated as restrictions on speech. If public funding of cam-
paigns is provided, this Analysis yields a clear answer. Restric-
tions on giving and spending money in connection with these 
elections do not restrict speech. Where public funding is not 
provided, courts will always have to ask whether the state has 
removed electioneering from the market sphere.  
D. OBJECTIONS 
This Article’s first contribution is to emphasize that the 
question addressed in campaign finance cases is not unique to 
the First Amendment context. Money is useful to the exercise of 
other constitutionally protected rights as well as, but not lim-
ited to First Amendment rights.182 This Article urges that the 
courts frame the question posed by campaign finance laws in 
this broader context. When do restrictions on the ability to give 
or spend money in connection with rights restrict those rights 
and when do they not? This Article’s second contribution is to 
offer an answer. This Part sketched the broad outlines of the 
proposed account. It is not a fully developed theory and thus 
does not work out all the difficulties and nuances of the ac-
count. In doing so, perhaps one will find that this theory is ul-
timately untenable. I hope not. But if so, progress has still been 
made by shining a light on the question the courts and com-
mentators must address and in taking some first steps toward 
providing an answer. 
With this caveat in mind, it is worth raising two important 
objections to the proposed view and offering some replies to 
these objections. The decision regarding which goods are to be 
distributed via the market and which are not ought to be left to 
                                                                                    
 182. See supra Part II (discussing how money provides incentives for the 
exercise of constitutionally protected rights other than First Amendment rights). 
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democratic decisionmakers, i.e., Congress, state legislatures, or 
voters (via referenda). These decisionmakers can opt for non-
market distribution, and if they do, a right which depends on 
the good distributed via nonmarket means does not include a 
right to spend money to effectuate it. One can challenge this 
view from two different directions.  
First, one can ask whether some goods can really be re-
moved from market-based distribution. For example, could 
Congress decide that abortion services are not to be provided by 
the market and instead provided by a national health service of 
some kind? In doing so, market principles of distribution would 
be replaced by other distributive principles. If such a national 
health service had limited resources, could it decide which 
abortions to provide and which to refuse, while simultaneously 
forbidding those excluded from paying for abortions privately? 
If so, does this violate the right to choose whether to continue a 
pregnancy, which is protected by the Constitution? 
This example raises important questions about the pro-
posed theory that require a reply. When the state removes a 
good from the market and substitutes an alternative distribu-
tive scheme for market-based distribution, this alternative 
must be an adequate alternative method of distribution. What 
makes the alternative distribution method adequate in part 
relates to whether the criteria adopted comport with the defini-
tion of the right at issue as the Court understands it. For ex-
ample, laws forbid buying and selling of votes and, instead, dis-
tribute votes on the basis of age and citizenship. This alterna-
tive distributive scheme for votes is adequate because it com-
ports with our understanding of the right to vote as a right to 
participate equally in political deliberation by persons mature 
enough to take part in such activity. The right to abort a previ-
able fetus has often been described as a right to choose whether 
to continue a pregnancy.183 Thus, in order to be considered ade-
quate, any alternative method of distribution must preserve the 
ability of women, in consultation with their doctors, to make 
this choice.  
A second objection challenges the proposed view from the 
other direction. It questions whether democratic decisionmak-
ers could constitutionally decide to distribute via the market 
some goods that we currently distribute via nonmarket means. 
                                                                                    
 183. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (characterizing the right to 
abortion as a “freedom of personal choice” in matters of procreation, which is 
one of the liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment).  
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For example, suppose Congress were to decide that the buying 
and selling of votes is permissible. Would this really be consti-
tutional? So long as each person gets one vote to freely sell, 
perhaps this is no more offensive to democratic principles than 
the current situation in which the wealthy are able to wield 
more political influence through contributions and spending. 
Here too, however, there are limits. The right, as understood by 
the Court, places some limitations on whether the good can be 
distributed via the market versus via a nonmarket based dis-
tributive scheme. It is reasoning of this sort that may help ex-
plain why the right to counsel in a criminal case has a positive 
dimension. Leaving the good of legal services completely in the 
market does not adequately meet the needs of criminal defense 
for defendants unable to purchase lawyers.184 Therefore, the 
Constitution is understood to require some public provision of 
this good.185  
One caveat is necessary before concluding this section. This 
Article argues that democratic decisionmakers should decide 
which goods should be distributed via the market and which 
should not. However, this position should not be confused with 
a view that there are no better or worse answers to give to 
these questions. Rather, I do have a normative view about 
which goods should be distributed via the market and which 
should not—at least about many important goods. I do not offer 
an account or defense of that normative vision here. Perhaps it 
will become necessary to do so. However, it is clear that people 
disagree about these questions and that this disagreement is 
reasonable. That being the case, the best approach—
normatively as well as pragmatically—is to leave these ques-
tions to resolution by democratic means.  
E. TARGETING THE SUPPRESSION OF FREE SPEECH 
This Article earlier acknowledged that laws that aim to 
suppress free speech raise important First Amendment con-
cerns.186 While the cases Sullivan musters in defense of C can-
not be justified on the grounds provided, perhaps they can be 
                                                                                    
 184. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963) (describing 
the difficulty of many indigent defendants in procuring a defense attorney).  
 185. See id. at 339–40 (“The Sixth Amendment provides, ‘In all criminal 
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of 
Counsel for his defence.’ We have construed this to mean that . . . counsel 
must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is 
competently and intelligently waived.” (first alteration in original)). 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 58–60. 
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justified on other grounds. In particular, perhaps at least some 
of the cases can be justified on the grounds that the state can-
not adopt laws which target free speech. One can often describe 
the governmental interest in these cases in multiple ways, as 
either suppressing speech or something else. Earlier I promised 
that the account provided by this Article would help to deter-
mine which interpretation is best, at least in some cases. It is 
now time to fulfill that promise. 
The answer lies in whether the state provides for the non-
market distribution of the good. A law that restricts abortion 
spending aims to suppress the exercise of the right to abortion 
because abortions are provided via the market. A law that re-
stricts buying and selling votes does not target the right to vote 
because votes are not distributed via the market. A law that 
restricts the amount of money a person can spend buying books 
would violate the First Amendment. This outcome can be ex-
plained in either of two ways. One can say that books (assum-
ing they are not “electioneering communications”) are distrib-
uted via the market and thus a law that restricts the right to 
buy books restricts the freedom of speech. Alternatively, one 
can say that the law targets speech or aims to suppress free 
speech because the fact that books are a good distributed in the 
market demonstrates that the best interpretation of the law is 
that it aims to suppress speech.  
Compare that example with a law that prohibits paying pe-
tition circulators in connection with ballot initiatives. This law 
does not target free speech. The legislature may determine the 
appropriate method to determine which ballot initiatives are 
placed on the ballot.187 There are of course many possible ways 
to do this. The legislature could forbid ballot initiatives alto-
gether, only allow state senators and representatives to propose 
them, require a certain number of people to request that a 
measure be added to the ballot (by requiring X number of sig-
natures, X number of e-mails, X number of text messages), 
specify the number that are allowed in advance and then auc-
tion them off to the highest bidder, etc. The list of possibilities 
is infinite. Note however that the last possibility makes ballot 
measures a commodity for sale in the market.188 If the ten ref-
                                                                                    
 187. There are limits to this claim, of course. The distribution method cho-
sen must comply with other constitutional guarantees. For example, the legis-
lature could not require that the ballot initiative be proposed or supported by 
men only. 
 188. However, this blatantly market-based approach would probably run 
afoul of the Constitution. See Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 
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erenda to be included in each election year are auctioned off, 
then the method for distributing this good is the market. By 
contrast, each of the methods that require a specified number 
of people to sign, e-mail, or text their attestation that they want 
the measure on the ballot distances the good from the market. 
They are not neutral. Some people have more time on their 
hands to collect signatures. Some people are home more than 
others and thus more likely to receive these solicitations. Some 
have cell phones and computers, making the e-mail and texting 
more accessible. Because these devices cost money, reliance on 
them is surely related to wealth. Nonetheless, the requirement 
of X number of signatures versus X dollars to get a petition on 
the ballot is a way to distribute ballot measures by nonmarket 
principles. This is most clearly seen when we compare this 
method with an auction or even with a sale at a set price. 
The law forbidding paying people to circulate petitions 
should be examined against this backdrop. If placement of a 
measure on the ballot is distributed by nonmarket principles 
(here by the ability to find enough willing volunteers to collect 
the needed petitions), then the right of free speech at issue in 
this case ought not to include the right to spend money to get 
one’s message out. By enacting the statute at issue in Meyer, 
Colorado had decided that inclusion of a ballot measure ought 
to be a function of the ability to find willing volunteers rather 
than the ability to spend or raise money.189  
Thus, a law that says one may not spend money to procure 
sex is not a restriction on the right to sexual intimacy even 
though the law specifically picks out sex as the thing on which 
one cannot spend one’s money. Nor is a law that forbids buying 
babies a restriction on procreative liberty despite the fact that 
the law picks out babies as the one “thing” one cannot buy. 
Where democratic decisionmakers have opted for a nonmarket 
distributive method, these restrictions on spending money on a 
good should not be understood as targeting the right (such as 
sexual intimacy or procreative liberty), but instead as part of a 
permissible legislative choice about the appropriate distributive 
mechanism for a good.  
But, one might argue, the right to free speech is different. 
This right specifically forbids Congress (or states) from passing 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
665–66 (1966) (finding that the use of poll taxes to determine voting eligibility 
is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment). 
 189. See Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 425–26 (1988) (discussing Colora-
do’s “interest in protecting the integrity of the [ballot] initiative process”).  
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laws that restrict speech and, thus, any law that picks out 
speech on its face is prohibited.190 While the First Amendment 
may be more amenable to facial challenges than other constitu-
tional provisions, and surely subjects laws that pick out expres-
sive actions to heightened judicial review,191 these facets of the 
First Amendment do not suffice to answer the basic question of 
whether a restriction on spending on speech is a law that we 
should describe as restricting speech. If the good used to speak 
is not distributed via the market then a law that restricts 
spending on that good is best understood as a law that protects 
the legislative choice to remove that good from the market rath-
er than a law that abridges speech.  
F. REASSESSING THE CRITIQUE 
Eugene Volokh argues that the fact that money is not 
speech is not important.192 It should be treated as part of the 
right to free speech.193 In support of this claim, he argues that 
“[m]oney isn’t lawyering, but the Sixth Amendment secures 
criminal defendants’ right to hire a lawyer. Money isn’t contra-
ception or abortions, but people have a right to buy condoms or 
pay doctors to perform abortions.”194 Volokh’s argument ap-
pears to suggest that all constitutionally protected rights in-
clude the right to spend money to effectuate them. As we saw in 
Part II, this is not correct. Moreover, the fact that the right to 
abort an early fetus and use contraception do include the right 
to spend money to effectuate them is not dispositive about oth-
er rights. As neither Congress nor a state legislature have es-
tablished a nonmarket distributive mechanism for condoms or 
abortions, the right to procreative liberty should be understood 
to include the right to spend money on condoms and abortions.  
The right to counsel example is more complex. Currently, 
criminal defense lawyers are provided for all criminal defend-
                                                                                    
 190. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 
62 STAN. L. REV. 1209, 1268 (2010) (arguing that the text of the First Amend-
ment entails that laws that restrict speech on their face are constitutional 
nullities). 
 191. See, e.g., Meyer, 486 U.S. at 425 (stating that statutes infringing upon 
First Amendment freedoms are subject to “exacting scrutiny” and that the bur-
den of states attempting to justify such statutes is “well-nigh insurmountable”).  
 192. See Volokh, supra note 9, at 1101 (“Well, of course money isn’t speech. 
But so what? The question is not whether the money is speech, but whether 
the First Amendment protects your right to speak using your money.”). 
 193. See id. 
 194. Id.  
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ants who are unable to pay for their own counsel.195 Thus, to a 
significant extent, counsel in criminal cases has become a non-
market good.196 Suppose a state were to pass a law forbidding 
people from paying money to secure private counsel in criminal 
cases. Following the logic of the view I put forward here, this 
law might well be constitutional. The state is permitted to de-
termine that counsel in a criminal case is a “good” to be distrib-
uted to all criminal defendants on the basis of need rather than 
on ability to pay. The state may determine that inequalities in 
wealth ought not to translate into inequalities in judicial out-
comes in criminal cases and thus that payment for private 
counsel in criminal cases is a “blocked exchange.”197 Does this 
law violate the Sixth Amendment right to counsel? All criminal 
defendants are entitled to state-provided counsel. The law 
simply forbids expending private resources on counsel. Perhaps 
this law shouldn’t be seen to violate the Sixth Amendment so 
long as the publicly provided counsel is constitutionally ade-
quate. The right to counsel simply does not include the right to 
spend money to effectuate it, as the legislature has determined 
that the good of criminal counsel is not to be distributed via the 
market.198 
On the other hand, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
may require counsel of one’s choosing rather than state-
appointed counsel.199 Moreover, it may require that such coun-
sel be independent of the state in a more robust way than the 
protections of professional obligations provide. If so, the means 
by which the government removes legal services in criminal 
cases from the market could require a mechanism that protects 
these ways of understanding the right at issue. A voucher sys-
tem might address these concerns.  
                                                                                    
 195. See Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344–45 (1963). 
 196. The fact that defendants are constitutionally entitled to have counsel 
provided if they cannot afford it does not change this analysis.  
 197. See WALZER, supra note 116, at 100–03 (enumerating a list of things 
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 198. Interestingly, in a case where a defendant challenged a pretrial forfei-
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491 U.S. 617, 642 (1989).  
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  CONCLUSION   
The most oft-quoted passage from Buckley is this: “the con-
cept that government may restrict the speech of some elements 
of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment.”200 The appeal of this 
statement rests on the sleight of hand involved in substituting 
“speech” for “the giving and spending of money.” The more ac-
curate statement is not so obvious: the concept that the gov-
ernment may restrict the spending power of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is 
wholly foreign to the First Amendment. It is not obvious that 
the government is disabled from determining which goods are 
to be distributed via market mechanisms and which are not. 
The First Amendment forbids restricting speech itself. This 
right does not automatically include the right to effective 
speech. The Court makes precisely this point in San Antonio 
Independent School District v. Rodriguez, when it declines to 
invalidate property tax-based school funding in Texas.201 The 
plaintiffs in Rodriguez made a strikingly similar argument to 
the one that won the day in Buckley and that continues to hold 
sway. They argued that “education is . . . a fundamental per-
sonal right because it is essential to the effective exercise of 
First Amendment freedoms and to intelligent utilization of the 
right to vote.”202 A good education facilitates effective speech in 
a similar way as money does. Nonetheless, the fact that educa-
tion facilitates the exercise of the right to free speech and the 
right to vote does not mean that education is a fundamental 
right, as the plaintiffs claimed in Rodriguez. And it certainly 
does not show that the right to an education is actually part of 
the First Amendment right of free speech itself. This assertion 
seems patently ludicrous. That it does not seem equally ludi-
crous when made with respect to the giving and spending of 
money is a result of the fact that when something is repeated 
often enough, it begins to sound necessary. The fact that the 
Court in Citizens United does not even bother to cite Buckley 
for the proposition that restrictions on spending money should 
be treated as restrictions on speech, and rather simply treats 
this claim as so obvious it needs neither citation nor argument, 
demonstrates that this transformation has become complete. It 
is thus especially important to examine it now.  
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